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[153] 
Evaluating Flexibility in                   
International Patent Law 
Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec* 
Global patent law has raced toward harmonization over the past decades. Countries with 
vastly different industries, values, and levels of development now offer robust patent 
rights with similar contours through membership in the World Trade Organization and 
consequent adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”). However, patent law is still far from harmonized among countries or 
static within countries. Jurisdictions tailor their patent laws to accommodate differences 
between industries, unforeseen inefficiencies, and diverse views of the costs and benefits 
associated with offering patent rights to stimulate innovation. Prior scholarly work 
consists of either doctrinal analyses of relevant governing treaties or utilitarian analyses of 
the measures’ consistency with an “ideal” level of patent protection. The first perspective 
sidesteps normative questions by assuming the balance between harmonization and 
flexibility embodied in TRIPS and provides little guidance for cases in which TRIPS 
compliance is unclear. The second adopts assumptions that either impose foreign 
preferences or tacitly accept local preferences embodied in the measure. Any conclusion 
thus over-privileges background preferences and predetermines a normative conclusion. 
 
This Article puts forth a framework for evaluation of a tailoring measure based on 
whether it meets the justifications for allowing flexibility while accounting for the 
concerns that favor uniformity and harmonization. The proposed framework looks to the 
implementing institution and the adequacy of the stakeholder representation to determine 
the desirability, from a global perspective, of a given mechanism. Rather than offering a 
strict formula, I suggest that honoring diversity among regimes requires acceptance of 
measures that are open to criticism from consequentialists but does not preclude critical 
analysis of the means of development or implementation. Such an analysis allows for a 
productive evaluation of tailoring measures that honors differences among jurisdictions 
while properly accounting for the justifications underlying harmonization. 
 
 * Lecturer in Law and Fellow in Law, Science & Technology at Stanford Law School. I would 
like to thank Albertina Antognini, Andrew Gilden, Paul Goldstein, Mark Lemley, Benjamin Liu, 
Gregory Mandel, Joost Pauwellyn, Jacob Sherkow, Marketa Trimble, Melissa Wasserman, and 
Andrew Woods, as well as participants in the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Sixth 
Advanced Research Forum on Intellectual Property Rights, the 2012 Intellectual Property Scholars 
Conference, and the 2013 Works in Progress in Intellectual Property Conference for comments and 
suggestions. I also thank Vicki Morris for excellent research assistance. 
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Introduction 
Patent law is territorial; each country grants rights that can only be 
enforced within its borders, and “there is no such thing as a ‘global 
patent.’”1 The decision by a government to grant a patent on an 
invention is a trade-off. A patent is a time-limited right to exclude, meant 
to provide incentives to invest and engage in innovation and to disclose 
the fruits of that innovation. This is an incentive that comes at the cost of 
public use and access to the technology on terms other than the 
inventor’s. Despite differences among fields of technologies that bear on 
the costs and potential profits associated with them, modern patent law is 
largely uniform within countries. Thus, the same rights to exclude—and 
 
 1. Martin J. Adelman et al., Global Issues in Patent Law 3 (2011). 
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attendant remedies—are available for inventions in all fields of 
technology, for all applicants, and, excepting antitrust violations or other 
misuse, without regard to the patent holder’s use of those rights. 
Countries may choose to deviate from this uniformity and thereby tailor 
the law to particular circumstances. Since the Paris Convention in the 
late nineteenth century, the first major international treaty to attempt a 
degree of harmonization of patent rights, the pendulum has been 
swinging toward greater harmonization among countries, and thus 
necessarily toward greater uniformity within countries. Harmonization 
efforts have reduced the flexibility of countries to enact tailoring 
measures. The strong prescriptions of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) and its enforcement 
mechanism2 may be indications that the international community is 
nearing the apex of this swing. Some further efforts at harmonization 
have moved to the formation of new arrangements, such as regional 
trade agreements and enforcement treaties. At the same time, 
developing and “least developed” countries, which have consistently 
been asked to increase the strength of patent rights and infringement 
remedies, are providing a counter-force. India has been at the forefront 
of this resistance—both during negotiations of TRIPS and through its 
expansive interpretation of flexibilities allowed by the agreement. Thus, 
India’s passage and interpretation of laws excluding certain types of 
chemicals from patentability and allowing for compulsory licensing of 
pharmaceutical products serve as examples of tailoring measures (or 
flexibilities) that reject a uniformly applicable patent law and thereby 
undermine global harmonization. 
India has come under criticism for its aggressive use of flexibilities 
but it is by no means alone in its attempts to tailor patent laws to fit its 
needs. The United States—a stalwart negotiator of global patent law 
harmonization—employs tailoring measures as well.3 The Drug Price 
 
 2. Margaret Chon describes the TRIPS agreement as effecting a “tectonic shift in the landscape 
of intellectual property law.” Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 
27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2821, 2824 (2005). 
 3. In addition to existing tailoring mechanisms, legal scholars have suggested numerous other 
means of tailoring patent laws to particular industries or situations. Some of these suggestions relate to 
judicial interpretation of current law. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis 
and How the Courts Can Solve It (2009) [hereinafter The Patent Crisis]; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does 
Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1361 (2009) 
(proposing a framework to evaluate existent and proposed tailoring measures based on the traditional 
economic case for intellectual property protection); Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for 
Patent Scope, 19 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 43 (2012) (suggesting that the courts use patentable 
subject matter doctrine as an explicit policy lever for calibrating patent scope); Sarah R. Wasserman 
Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 733, 742–48 (2012) (suggesting that 
courts analyze the public interest in granting incentives to innovate and maintain access in order to 
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Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the “Hatch-
Waxman Act”) provides a complex legislative framework that interacts 
with the patent law to alter the incentive structure for pioneer, patent-
holding pharmaceutical companies, and for generic drug companies 
seeking to market drugs following the expiration of the patent term. The 
exclusive marketing rights granted by Hatch-Waxman provides “pseudo-
patent” protection.4 In addition, the courts have interpreted and applied 
the seemingly uniform law in industry-specific ways, affecting both the 
availability of patents in some fields and the availability of remedies to 
certain types of entities. This is not unique to the United States. The 
protections afforded by a patent are only theoretically uniform within a 
given jurisdiction. Because of the heterogeneous nature of the inventions 
and technologies covered, perfect uniformity would be as difficult to 
assess as it would be to achieve. As a result, all patent systems contain 
laws that apply in non-uniform ways, whether by design or in application. 
Nevertheless, developed countries have strongly pursued 
international harmonization, negotiating international and bilateral 
agreements that cement high minimum levels of patent rights in member 
countries of the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”). These 
agreements permit only minimal exceptions and are backed by the 
considerable weight of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. 
Moreover, the flexibility that is incorporated in the TRIPS agreement is 
based on currently accepted tailoring mechanisms but does not allow for 
future variations.5 The international legal system is on a slow march to 
harmonize, unify, and entrench patent laws without a methodology for 
analyzing and evaluating existing and potential future flexibilities. In 
particular, it is missing a means of coming to a country-neutral method of 
evaluation that recognizes the purposes and value of a patent system 
while accepting that tailoring mechanisms will necessarily reflect the 
 
determine the appropriateness of a permanent injunction for a company that lacks market share). 
Other suggestions would require legislative action. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael 
Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 207 (2011) (suggesting two new patent forms in addition 
to the current system to mitigate social costs of traditional patents and increase access by subsequent 
inventors). 
 4. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich. Telecomm. & 
Tech. L. Rev. 345, 359–64 (2007) (explaining how FDA regulation provides similar protections to 
patent law, often for purposes that align more closely with patent law than with the health and safety 
concerns more typically associated with its mission). 
 5. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 95, 98–100 (2004) (discussing how TRIPS does not 
allow flexibility for future negotiation of similar arrangements, even where all stake-holders are 
represented in bargaining, and suggesting that because the WTO’s dispute settlement body looks at 
challenged legislation piece-meal, the result is that concessions benefiting the public are more likely to 
be struck down while measures appealing to patent-holders will be upheld, thus undermining the 
negotiations). 
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regimes in which they are conceived and implemented. Doctrinal analysis 
of a particular measure to determine whether it is allowed by TRIPS 
takes the balance struck by the agreement as a given. Although clearly 
practical and necessary, this analysis does not help us choose among 
options allowed by TRIPS. In addition, it fails to provide normative 
conclusions, though it may be used to support already-formed opinions 
about the desirability of a tailoring mechanism. When applied expansively, 
a utilitarian analysis is similarly conclusory. A utilitarian cost-benefits 
analysis can theoretically determine normative value, but this type of 
conclusion has little extrinsic insight. It relies on assessments of the utility 
of innovation, the costs of reduced access, and the strength of the 
connection between the incentives granted and the innovation encouraged. 
But these are the very measures that are likely to vary among countries. 
Ignoring such differences undermines some purposes of having flexibility; 
adopting local preferences uncritically undermines the purposes of 
uniformity and harmonization. Conclusions are thereby determined by the 
original assumptions. While endorsing the utilitarian view of the patent 
grant, this Article accepts that such an analysis may yield different results 
in various countries and suggests how these results may be evaluated on 
their ability to promote the purposes of harmonization, even while 
deviating from it. 
This Article proposes a framework to analyze and evaluate the use 
of flexibilities in patent law from an international perspective. Such a 
framework has descriptive value in comparisons of patent protection 
among countries with varying levels of development. It also has 
prescriptive value, allowing for normative claims about when tailoring 
measures may be desirable departures from international standards and 
how they may best be implemented. 
Harmonization among countries (and uniformity within countries) 
can be justified by arguments sounding in certainty, fairness, and 
economy, as well as public choice arguments that point out the possibility 
of capture in specialized laws. Certainty is of value to those engaged in 
innovation whose potential to attract investors is based upon the future 
ability to protect inventions. Harmonized laws protect certainty interests. 
Proponents of harmonization also argue that it is unfair for all the 
members of a country with high levels of patent protection to bear the 
costs of research and development (passed on to consumers through the 
higher costs associated with patented products), while those in countries 
with lower levels of protection gain the same benefits from the 
innovation.6 In addition, low barriers to trade have resulted in 
 
 6. Nor are lower levels of protection the only method of achieving greater levels of access to 
innovation. Countries that enable domestic price discrimination (through local rules of exhaustion or 
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increasingly globalized businesses that seek protection and engage in 
production in multiple jurisdictions. Thus, harmonization of laws is 
supported by considerations of economy for companies that seek rights 
worldwide. Sacrifices in flexibility may therefore be justified by decreasing 
the costs of bringing innovation to many different countries. Finally, for 
laws that apply uniformly across industries, pressure in support of or in 
opposition to the laws will come from multiple viewpoints and be apparent 
to a variety of stakeholders, whereas laws that target specific industries are 
subject to one-sided lobbying and a dilution of opposition. 
Flexibility can serve important purposes as well, allowing for 
tailored efficiency and the incorporation of diverse local interests, values, 
and needs. Flexibility also fosters experimentation and improvement in 
the law. Measures that tailor patent law to specific industries or problems 
allow solutions to the inefficiencies inherent in a uniform system. In 
addition, because different countries have different views on the balance 
between incentives to innovate and the need for access to inventions, 
allowing for flexibility honors the diversity of the countries that have 
nevertheless come together to express the value of patent systems in 
encouraging innovation. These different views may be based on how 
innovation and access are respectively valued, but may also reflect the 
differing development needs of countries. Finally, from a federalist or neo-
federalist perspective, variation among laws allows us to humbly recognize 
that improvement in the law is always possible and often desirable. 
These competing justifications are expressions of abstract values. 
Their prescriptions become concrete when applied to evaluate specific 
tailoring measures. In particular, looking at how well specific tailoring 
measures have taken the viewpoints of all relevant stakeholders into 
account allows an evaluation of whether the measure is useful in attaining 
tailored efficiency and meeting the needs of the relevant jurisdiction. At 
the same time, it answers concerns about possible capture and other 
justifications for a harmonized system. Accounts of the institutional 
implementation of a tailoring measure similarly permit an assessment of 
whether it meets the justifications for flexibility while accounting for the 
concerns raised by uniformity. 
This Article begins with an explanation of the patent grant, its 
purposes, and its generally uniform application to various fields of 
technology. Next, the Article describes tailoring measures that, despite 
this uniformity, have been adopted by India and the United States, 
including their implementation processes and the level of relevant 
stakeholder representation in their development. The discussion then 
 
other market mechanisms) encourage broader consumer access without impairment of exclusive 
rights. 
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turns to an explanation of the historical move toward harmonization in 
patent law and counter movements. This account leads into a discussion 
of the arguments for uniformity and harmonization in patent law, 
followed by arguments for tailoring and flexibility. These arguments 
inform a framework for evaluation based on the implementing institution 
and the stakeholder involvement in development of a tailoring measure. 
The Article then demonstrates how this framework may apply for 
analysis of particular provisions of law, and to some general conclusions 
that can be drawn about institutional choice in implementation of these 
tailoring measures. 
I.  Patents: The Modern Patent and Its Limits 
Patents are government-granted rights to inventors meant to 
encourage scientific progress.7 As such, the patent is characterized by the 
right to prevent others from making, selling, or using a patented product 
or process for a specified number of years.8 Most national patent laws 
require patented products or processes to be novel, non-obvious, and 
useful, although the legal terms for these requirements vary.9 “Patents 
are widely considered essential . . . to provide appropriate incentives for 
innovation.”10 The exclusive right embodied in a patent is meant to offer 
protection for information that may otherwise be easily appropriated 
and, because it is information-based, copied without any tangible (and 
therefore recoverable) depreciation to the inventor.11 The protection 
offered by a patent thus encourages investment in innovation by allowing 
exclusion of others from the market. Social benefits associated with the 
patent system include access to innovation that otherwise might not have 
occurred. This access is typically had at a higher price during the course 
of the patent, and, due to market competition, lower prices following 
expiration of the patent. Patents also require that an inventor disclose 
the nature and functioning of her invention, thereby allowing others to 
 
 7. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”). 
 8. John H. Jackson et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, 
Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational Economic 
Relations 844–45 (3d ed. 1995). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 845. 
 11. Accordingly, patents solve a free-rider problem that creates incentives for would-be 
innovators to be “second-movers” in the market place, waiting for others to invent and profiting from 
their efforts while appropriating the market for the invented good.  
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benefit from the knowledge and to engage in further innovation that 
builds upon it.12 
The American patent system is representative of many modern 
national patent systems.13 To promote scientific progress, American patent 
law, like that of other countries, offers a time-limited right to exclude 
others to inventors who disclose their inventions.14 This formulation of the 
purposes of patent law is consistent with the utilitarian justification for 
intellectual property. Also termed the “incentive theory” of patents, this 
justification suggests that patents are necessary incentives for innovation. 
According to this theory, inventors might choose to keep their inventions 
as trade secrets without patent protections, thereby depriving the public 
and other innovators from knowledge of and access to the inventions.15 
Patents also may reassure investors, without whom the inventions could 
not be brought to market. This formulation is attractive because it suggests 
that one might weigh incentives to innovate with other considerations—
such as the interest of the public in access to inventions or the needs of 
downstream innovators or producers to access new technology—thereby 
determining an ideal balance of interests.16 In contrast, accounts based on 
natural law suggest that inventors have inherent rights based on creating 
 
 12. See Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy 29 (2000) 
(Intellectual property rights “generate monopoly positions that reduce current consumer welfare in 
return for providing adequate payoffs to innovation, which then raises future consumer welfare.”). 
 13. See infra Part II (discussing the history of global patent law and the move to harmonization, 
while section III, infra, references current differences among these systems). This Part, however, 
serves merely to demonstrate the philosophical bases and general contours of modern-day patents. 
 14. Modern American patent law is rooted in the Constitution, which gives Congress the power 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1022 (1989), reprinted in Martin J. Adelman et al., Cases and 
Materials on Patent Law 33–34 (1998) (explaining how the courts expect the right of exclusion to 
provide an incentive for individuals to invest in research and to disclose their new inventions, thereby 
benefiting the general public); see also David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law 
Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 181, 195–97 (2009) 
(analyzing how the patent system offers a solution to the public goods problem by granting inventors 
exclusive right to control their invention for twenty years). 
 15. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a 
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful 
advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”); William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 12–16 
(2003) (utilizing “the tragedy of the commons” to demonstrate the need for individual property rights 
in order to encourage innovation). 
 16. Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy suggest direct application of this sort of weighing in The 
Inducement Standard of Patentability, arguing that a patent application should be denied “if the 
innovation would be created and disclosed even without patent protection,” because “denying a patent 
on the innovation costs society nothing . . . and saves society from needlessly suffering the well-known 
negative consequences of patents.” Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard 
of Patentability, 120 Yale L.J. 1590, 1594 (2011). 
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something new.17 However, the utilitarian vision of the incentive theory is 
most often relied upon to justify taking innovation out of the public 
domain for some time period immediately after invention.18 
The patent grant constitutes the right to exclude others from making, 
using, selling, or offering for sale a patented invention or performing a 
patented process.19 There are, of course, costs associated with granting 
patents that are ultimately absorbed by consumers of innovation. 
Because others are excluded from the market, patent holders can charge 
a premium on a patented product, which explains why patents are 
sometimes characterized as monopolies.20 This premium may result in 
reduced access to certain innovations for the duration of the patent, 
affecting consumers and other innovators who are interested in building 
upon prior innovations. Patents also require transaction costs,21 including 
costs associated with obtaining22 and enforcing23 patents. The U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (the “PTO”) supports itself with the fees it sets;24 
nonetheless, one can expect those fees get passed on to consumers. 
 
 17. Following Locke’s labor theory, the inventor’s rights in her invention are derived from the 
labor with which it is imbued, resulting in property rights over the resulting invention. See, e.g., 
Holger Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to 
Medicines 29–30 (2007) [hereinafter Hestermeyer, Human Rights] (explaining—and dismissing—a 
natural law rationale for patent law); Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property 34–67 
(2011) (discussing the application of John Locke’s ideas to theories justifying intellectual property 
law). Other justifications for the patent system include the contract theory, the reward theory, and the 
prospect theory. Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra, at 30–33. 
 18. Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 31–32.  
 19. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 20. See Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property 
Law, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 139, 191–92 (2008) (explaining the common, hostile view of patents as 
monopolies during the post-war years). But see United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 
178, 186 (1933), amended by 289 U.S. 706 (1933) (“Though often so characterized, a patent is not, 
accurately speaking, a monopoly . . . . In consideration of [an invention’s] disclosure and the 
consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted.”). 
 21. David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 677, 
696–98 (2012). 
 22. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 21, at 689–90 (estimating that between legal costs and 
Patent Office fees, “an average patentee will spend approximately $22,000 to successfully prosecute a 
patent application.”). Filing fees for patents start in the hundreds of dollars, but rise with additional 
claims, drawings, and length of application; issuance of the patent comes with its own fees as well. See 
Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1, 
41, 42); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Current Fee Schedule (Oct. 4, 2013). 
 23. See David E. Sosnowski, Resolving Patent Disputes via Mediation: The Federal Circuit and the 
ITC Find Success, Md. B.J., Apr. 2012, at 24, 26 (citing findings on patent litigation costs that averaged 
$916,000 when less than $1 million was at risk, $2.8 million when between $1 million and $25 million 
was at risk, and $6 million when more was at risk). 
 24. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388, 
1388–91 (1990); see also Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand 
Substantive Patent Law, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 379, 407 (2011) (explaining the costs to the agency of the 
various stages of examination and grant as compared to the fees charged). 
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There are also costs to other innovators associated with searching for 
patents and obtaining licenses from patent holders or designing around 
others’ patents. Because of the territorial nature of the patent right, the 
costs associated with obtaining and enforcing a patent are duplicated in 
each jurisdiction in which a patent is sought. 
Although there are costs to a patent system, the law constrains the 
rights granted in multiple ways. Patent law includes constraints on the 
subject matter eligible for protection.25 In addition, patent law limits 
patent grants to inventions that are novel, non-obvious, and useful.26 The 
scope of the patent is limited to the invention as set forth in the claims 
and described in the specification, and the patent applicant must further 
describe the best mode of the invention in order to receive a patent.27 
Last, the scope of the rights granted by the patent may be constrained. 
Thus, the right to exclude will not be enforced in cases of misuse.28 In 
addition, permanent injunctions do not issue automatically after a patent 
has been adjudged infringed. Rather, the court balances a set of factors 
including the harm done to the patent holder by infringement, the 
adequacy of money damages to compensate her, and the balance of 
hardships to the parties and the public interest before determining whether 
an injunction is appropriate.29 Globally, various countries have enacted 
compulsory licensing statutes, allowing private companies to circumvent 
a patent holder’s refusal to license (at a “reasonable” rate) when the 
market is not being served by the patent holder or existing licensees.30 
The duration of the patent term is another limitation. The rights of the 
patent holder expire when the patent does. The patent term is currently 
twenty years from the date the application was filed,31 though it has been 
changed at various times.32  
American patent law is generally considered a uniform law, in that it 
applies uniformly to all fields of technology. In addition, the rights and 
remedies associated with a patent are not dependent on the identity or 
business choices of the patent holder. This view is subject to some strong 
caveats, which I will mention here and elaborate on in Part III. Any 
discipline must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be patent 
 
 25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 26. Id. §§ 101–03. 
 27. Id. § 112. 
 28. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493–94 (1942). The doctrine has been 
limited somewhat by statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012). 
 29. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
 31. Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 154. 
 32. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) 
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 154) (implementing a TRIPS-compliant patent term of twenty years from filing 
of the patent rather than the previous seventeen-year term, measured from issuance). 
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eligible, so some areas are categorically excluded—such as mathematics—
whereas some are always eligible—such as engineering.33 Section 101 is 
technology-neutral, however, and the subsequent patentability requires 
only that an invention be new, useful, and non-obvious, and includes 
provisions for remedies. 
The laws governing patents vary among jurisdictions, although less 
so following the passage of TRIPS as part of the WTO agreement. Under 
the incentive theory of patents, lawmakers should form limitations to 
encourage innovation without overly harming the access interests of the 
public and other innovators. The contours and implementation of a given 
regime reflect the value it puts on the two sides of this balance, inter alia. 
However, local variations have taken a backseat to the larger project of 
harmonization, beginning with the Paris Convention and gathering steam 
with the passage of TRIPS and subsequent regional developments. 
II.  International Patent Law: Moving Toward Harmonization 
A. Early History 
The practice of granting patents originated in Venice in the late 
fifteenth century and eventually spread throughout Europe.34 Early 
patents may have been granted by municipalities or “petty German 
states”35 but in Great Britain, patents were granted by the sovereign, and 
have since become “creature[s] of national law”36 throughout the world.37 
As such, every country legislates and administers its own patent laws. 
This has allowed for great variation in the protection of patent rights 
among countries. In their early development, some European countries 
had weaker patent protection, possibly for the purpose of “borrow[ing] 
and copy[ing] freely from more advanced nations abroad.”38 As late as 
the nineteenth century, for example, Switzerland and the Netherlands 
 
 33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–01 (2012). 
 34. Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System, 
1660–1800, at 40 (1988). MacLeod explains how the fifteenth-century Venetian patent system spurred 
the development of other modern patent systems: “Emigrant Italian craftsmen, seeking protection 
against local competition and guild restrictions as a condition of imparting their skills, disseminated 
knowledge of their patent systems around Europe.” Id. at 11. See John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: 
A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 21–23 (2007) (“[P]olicy set forth in Venetian 
statute was quite plainly copied throughout Europe.”). 
 35. MacLeod, supra note 34, at 11. 
 36. Adelman, supra note 1, at 1. 
 37. See Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 7 
(5th ed. 2011) (discussing how state patents were granted in the American colonies and how conflicts 
among the states led to the creation of a national patent system, rooted in the Constitution). 
 38. Madhavi Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global 
Justice 179 (2012). 
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did not have patent systems for more than fifty years.39 Countries termed 
“least developed” countries and “developing” countries40 have historically 
had lower levels of patent protection than developed countries. The 
modern and accelerating trend, however, has been toward the adoption 
and harmonization of patent laws. 
Harmonization has focused on different areas of patent law in order 
to address a number of problems faced by those interested in doing 
business globally. Some harmonization measures address procedural 
difficulties that emerge from filing for and maintaining patents in multiple 
jurisdictions; others address substantive issues related to the grant of 
patents and attempts to assert rights—the substance of which may vary—
in legal regimes that apply different standards to enforcement.41 Both types 
of harmonization have been addressed by successive, multi-lateral treaties. 
These instruments, beginning with the Paris Convention for Industrial 
Property (“Paris Convention”), have used different mechanisms to reach 
harmonization, ranging from easing procedural burdens on applicants to 
defining the circumstances and degree to which member countries may 
depart from an absolute right to exclude.42 
The Paris Convention was ratified by eleven European countries in 
1883, joined by the United States in 1887, and now has 175 signatories.43 
The Paris Convention included provisions that eased procedural 
difficulties with obtaining patents in multiple countries by allowing 
applicants to claim a priority date to the first application filed in a member 
state, alleviating the potential need to file simultaneously in multiple 
jurisdictions.44 It also contained provisions that affected substantive 
rights. Article 5 affects the scope of rights granted by a patent by 
permitting countries to “take legislative measures providing for the grant 
of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the 
 
 39. Merges & Duffy, supra note 37, at 9 (citing Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent 
Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. Econ. Hist. 1 (1950)). 
 40. “The WTO recognizes as least-developed countries (LDCs) those countries which have been 
designated as such by the United Nations.” Least-developed Countries, World Trade Org. [WTO] 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm. Least 
Developed Countries are nations identified as such by the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council through its Committee for Development Policy and includes countries with “a low per capita 
income, a low level of human resource development and a high degree of economic vulnerability.” 
Criteria for the Least Developed Countries, World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], 
http://www.wipo.int/ldcs/en/criteria_ldcs.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 41. Adelman, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing procedural and substantive problems that an inventor 
seeking protection globally will face). 
 42. Id. at 3–4. 
 43. Id. at 4; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as amended July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
 44. See id. art. 4 (providing a twelve month grace period for filing). In addition, the Paris 
Convention provided for “national treatment,” requiring member states to provide equal treatment to 
foreign nationals and their own citizens. Id. 
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exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, 
failure to work.”45 Thus, countries could (but needed not) require that a 
patent holder either practice her patented invention locally or lose the 
right to exclude others from making or selling the patented product.46 
Where a patent holder failed to work a patent locally, a compulsory 
license could be granted, allowing others to make, use, or sell otherwise 
infringing goods after paying a reasonable amount, subject to certain 
limitations.47 This provision, although allowing for tailoring of patent 
rights, at the time a strengthened the patent grant because prior to the 
Paris Convention, failure to work a patent could result in forfeiture.48 
Although the Paris Convention addresses both procedural and 
substantive elements of global patent law, the treaty reflects the political 
reality that it is easier to agree on harmonization of laws that are seen as 
procedural. Thus, Article 4 requires all signatories to give priority (equal 
status) to foreign filings, whereas Article 5 is permissive, allowing 
countries to issue compulsory licenses under certain broadly defined 
circumstances. Specifically, Article 5 does not harmonize the laws with 
respect to compulsory licensing because it neither requires implementation 
of compulsory licensing nor prohibits such implementation. It merely 
proclaims that countries may have such a provision and describes the 
allowable contours.49 
Although widely adopted, industrialized countries eventually 
viewed the Paris Convention as inadequate because it failed to set 
substantive standards of patent law, such as criteria for patentability or a 
 
 45. Id. art. 5A(2). 
 46. Id. art. 5(A) (limiting the conditions under which a compulsory license may be granted to at 
least four years after the filing of the patent or three years after the grant of the patent, stating that a 
compulsory license must be refused “if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons” and 
requiring that compulsory licenses be non-exclusive). This requirement actually strengthened the 
rights of the patent holder. Previously, numerous countries had working requirements that called for a 
forfeiture of patent rights upon the failure of a patent holder to work the patented invention. J.H. 
Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, 
and International Trade after the GATT’S Uruguay Round, 20 Brook. J. Int’l L. 75, 100 n.113 (1993). 
Thus, by allowing only a compulsory license, the Paris Convention allowed the patent holder to 
maintain ownership of her patent and receive licensing revenue from the recipient of the compulsory 
license. 
 47. Id. The Paris Convention required that the patent holder be granted at least three years 
before the patent could be challenged for failure to work, and allowed the patent holder to challenge 
an application for a compulsory license by demonstrating why it was taking longer to bring the 
invention to market.  
 48. Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented 
Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework Under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice of 
Canada and the USA, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper 
No. 5, at 10, (June 2003), http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf. 
 49. See id. 
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patent term.50 Movement in substantive harmonization would still take 
some time. The next notable treaty to attempt harmonization of patent 
laws was the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”), effective 1970.51 The 
PCT was focused on procedural harmonization. Building on the Paris 
Convention, the PCT was meant “to simplify and render more economical 
the obtaining of protection for inventions where protection is sought in 
several countries.”52 Thus, it provided a method of filing patent 
applications in multiple countries simultaneously, administered by the then 
newly-created World Intellectual Property Organization (the “WIPO”), 
which also administers the Paris Convention.53 This centralized process for 
filing patents did not impact the standards for patentability of signatories 
or the substantive rights associated with subsequently granted patents. 
B. The TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement in 1995 marked another move toward 
uniformity in patent law.54 In part because the TRIPS Agreement is an 
annex to the Uruguay Round Agreement forming the World Trade 
Organization, the focus on substantive harmonization is not surprising. 
The role of technology and innovation in goods in international trade 
had grown significantly since the drafting of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).55 The lower trade barriers that resulted 
from the GATT led to more transnational production and a proliferation 
of international enterprises. The purpose of the negotiations leading to 
the WTO was to further facilitate trade by constraining, reconciling, and 
harmonizing differing trading practices among nations.56 However, the 
minimum levels of intellectual property protection advocated by the 
 
 50. “By the late 1970s, from the standpoint of industrialized country patent holders, the Paris 
Convention was most notable for what it does not do. The Paris Convention does not define a patent or 
what criteria are used for granting it. It does not prescribe subject-matter coverage, it does not set a 
minimum—or maximum—term of a patent, it does not define the rights of patent holders, and it was 
perceived as having a weak dispute settlement mechanism.” Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property, 
International Protection, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶ 21 (2010). 
 51. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
 52. Id. pmbl. 
 53. Adelman, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining how the PCT allows for centrally filing a patent 
application and noting the countries in which the applicant would like to apply for patent protection); 
see also Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), TRIPS Issues Papers No. 3, at 4, (2003) (discussing 
the history of WIPO, its creation under the Stockholm Convention, and subsequent status as a 
specialized agency of the United Nations). 
 54. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 55. Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property 
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 689, 696 (1989). 
 56. Charan Devereaux et al., 1 Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation 2 (Inst. for Int’l Econs. 
ed., 2006). 
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developed countries were in sharp contrast to the desires of developing 
countries.57 
Negotiations leading to TRIPS divided participants into developing 
and least developed countries. On the one hand, developed countries 
pushed for harmonization and strong protection, but on the other hand, 
least developed countries advocated flexibility for countries to 
implement lower levels of intellectual property protection.58 The United 
States was one of the strongest voices in support of uniformity among 
domestic patent law regimes.59 Indeed, the United States has been 
criticized for using coercive negotiating techniques to gain the consensus 
of developing countries.60 In particular, the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative threatened countries with trade retaliations under 
Special 301 Report61 if they chose to object to the negotiating positions of 
the United States on intellectual property rights in the TRIPS agreement.62 
Ultimately, compromises were made and a formal agreement was reached. 
The TRIPS Agreement has provided a big step toward patent 
harmonization.63 Requirements address patent-eligible subject matter, 
patentability standards, and the duration and scope of rights. Thus, 
TRIPS requires that patents be available “without discrimination as to . . . 
 
 57. The introduction of intellectual property to trade discussions in the Uruguay Round negotiations 
of the GATT were proceeded by a clash at WIPO in which developed countries tried to revise the Paris 
Convention to include stronger protections for intellectual property rights and the developing countries 
formed a movement in favor of a new international economic order and sought to “relax protection of 
intellectual property,” inter alia. Abbott, supra note 50, ¶ 26. 
 58. Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition 
Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 401, 404 (2004). 
 59. See Abbott, supra note 55, at 692 (explaining how the United States resolved to protect 
intellectual property rights, whether unilaterally or multilaterally); see also Devereaux et al., supra 
note 56, at 1; Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between Commercial and Social 
Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 Fla. J. Int’l L. 193, 194 (2002) (explaining that the 
lobbying Intellectual Property Committee, “which consists of chief executive officers from a handful of 
well-connected and economically powerful American-based multinational corporations” played a 
significant role in drafting and pushing for adoption of TRIPs). 
 60. Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 39–40 (describing how the United States 
withdrew certain trade benefits and threatened trade sanctions under Section 301 of the Trade Act in 
retaliation for refusals to grant certain patent rights). 
 61. See generally Demetrios Marantis, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 Special 
301 Report. 
 62. See Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 39–40; see also Clyde H. Farnsworth, 
Washington’s Hard Line on Trade, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1989, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/25/business/washington-s-hard-line-on-trade.html (reporting that during 
an interview, then-Deputy United States Trade Representative S. Linn Williams defended the U.S. threat 
to use trade sanctions against Brazil for its lack of sufficient protection of patent rights for 
pharmaceuticals). 
 63. See Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS 
Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 1571, 1574 (2009). 
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the field of technology” in addressing patentable subject matter.64 
Pharmaceutical patents presented a challenge as there was not a 
consensus among countries on their patent eligibility. Developing 
countries did not want to be bound to offer such protection but the 
agreement ultimately requires that patents be available for 
pharmaceutical products, allowing a grace period before the requirement 
entered into force and making provisions for protection in countries that 
had yet to implement a regime that allowed them.65 Although the terms 
used by member countries differ, all recognize that to be patentable, a 
claimed invention must be new, nonobvious, and useful.66 In addition, 
TRIPS requires a minimum patent term of twenty years from the date 
the patent is filed.67 
Although the negotiations and resulting agreement evidenced a 
strong tide toward harmonization and increased intellectual property 
rights worldwide, there were other undercurrents to the story. For 
example, developing countries negotiated for trade concessions unrelated 
to intellectual property rights and were thereby able to open markets in 
areas of particular economic interest.68 These negotiations make an 
objective evaluation of the interests represented by the TRIPS 
agreement more difficult. We are accustomed to seeing patent protection 
as a balance between the competing, private interests of patent holders 
and the access interests of the public.69 Adding an orthogonal set of 
interests upsets the logical symmetry; as a result, discussions of the 
balance struck by TRIPS rarely take these non-intellectual property 
concessions into account.70 From the utilitarian point of view, this makes 
 
 64. TRIPS, supra note 54, art. 27.1. But see id. art. 27.2 (allowing exceptions for inventions “the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre 
public or morality”); see also id. art. 27.3 (allowing exclusion from patentability of “diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals” and “plants and animals 
other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes”). 
 65. See id. arts. 65–66; see also World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 
14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration] 
(extending the transition period for least developed country members with respect to pharmaceutical 
products); see also TRIPS, supra note 54, art. 70.8–9 (requiring countries to make certain provisions 
for pharmaceutical patents to be filed even if those countries did not yet recognize eligibility for 
pharmaceutical patents). 
 66. TRIPS, supra note 54, art. 27. 
 67. Id. art. 33. 
 68. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS: The 
Resilience of the International Intellectual Property Regime 32 (2012) [hereinafter 
Neofederalist Vision] (casting the TRIPS agreement as an intellectual property “tax” developing 
countries accepted as the cost of doing business in other sectors). 
 69. See supra Part I. 
 70. For those who ascribe to a non-utilitarian justification for intellectual property rights, there is 
less difficulty. For example, if access rights are seen as a moral imperative in some situations, the 
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sense. An optimal patent system, under such a view, is one which 
balances private and public interests in a way that best encourages 
innovation. Yet, where countries stand in as proxies for these interests, 
the complexities of a normative evaluation of patent law are brought into 
relief. A need for access to medicine by the people of a developing 
country may be weighed against the economic gain those people face at 
the prospect of selling their goods in a new market. More generally, and 
as this Article discusses below, the commercial needs of any given 
country will play a role in the level of patent protection that country 
seeks to implement independent of the binary balance discussed above. 
This is demonstrated by another concession made in negotiations. A 
temporal concession also mitigated the requirement of strong levels of 
intellectual property protection in TRIPS: developing countries and least 
developed countries did not have to implement the agreement until 
2005.71 Although the developing countries have now implemented 
legislation in order to become TRIPS-compliant, least developed 
countries have continued to request and be granted extensions for 
TRIPS-compliance. Certainly these delays allowed necessary time for 
countries to consider and implement a complex legal and regulatory 
regime. However, for those who have noted that many now-developed 
countries have strengthened their patent law regimes synchronously with 
domestic industrial growth, the delay in TRIPS compliance should again 
show us that no country can fully be a proxy for “the public interest.” 
Thus, for countries considered developing at the time TRIPS was 
negotiated, stronger intellectual property rights were predictable as their 
industry grew. By postponing the implementation of TRIPS until 2005, 
these countries had more time to lay the industrial infrastructure that 
would allow domestic industry to blossom under a stronger regime of 
intellectual property rights.72 These side stories illustrate the mistake of 
assuming that developed countries take positions representing “private” 
interests while developing countries represent the needs of the public. 
 
bargain struck under TRIPS cannot impose contrary restrictions. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 17, at 
270–87. 
 71. See TRIPS, supra note 54, at art. 66.1 (providing that least developed member countries have 
a grace period of ten years for implementing most of the requirements of the agreement, with the 
possibility of an extension). But see id. art. 70.8 (requiring members who do not implement patent 
protection for pharmaceutical products or agricultural chemical products when the WTO agreement 
enters into force to make certain provisions by which applications for such patents can be filed, thus 
preserving their filing dates in anticipation of the availability of such patents). 
 72. Indeed, companies that have focused on production of generic drugs in India, for example, 
have begun investing in research and development for innovative drugs. See, e.g., Kiran Somvanshi, 
Innovation Will Be Key to Survival, Says Glen Saldanha, Chairman & MD, Glenmark Pharma, Econ. 
Times, Dec. 21, 2011, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-12-20/news/ 
30534740_1_indian-pharma-generics-glenmark-pharma.  
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Each has a variety of stakeholders whose needs sometimes follow the 
same path and sometimes pull in different directions. Understanding the 
role and input of these stakeholders is important to any attempt to make 
normative claims about individual patent provisions in any given country. 
The common view that the TRIPS agreement imposes rigid 
obligations on its members has been criticized. There are some who now 
argue that the actions of developing countries in the years since TRIPS 
was implemented show that they may have negotiated more carefully 
than observers initially recognized. They included language, for example, 
that was open to the possibility of weaker intellectual property rights 
under some circumstances.73 It is not clear that the language reflects 
carefully-concocted nuance as opposed to the customary indeterminacy 
of language subject to legal interpretation, but the developed countries’ 
interpretations of particular terms is certainly being challenged.74 In 
addition, the TRIPS Agreement does not, for the most part, address the 
procedure of harmonization. Thus, the Agreement requires only that 
countries follow “reasonable procedures and formalities” in implementing 
the agreement, without specifying the means by which the agreement must 
be implemented.75 This has left countries flexibility in their methods of 
becoming TRIPS-compliant. 
A word about enforcement is also necessary, as it distinguishes 
agreements that form part of the WTO agreement from other areas of 
public international law. The inclusion of TRIPS in the WTO gave the 
Agreement teeth previously lacking in international intellectual property 
agreements, allowing member countries to challenge each others’ 
practices before the dispute settlement body of the WTO.76 That body 
does not award the traditional remedies that domestic courts award 
private parties to a dispute, such as compensatory and other damages 
and injunctive relief. Rather, where a violation is found, the offending 
country is given time to bring its law into compliance; if the violation 
continues, the members bringing the case are permitted to retaliate by 
 
 73. Neofederalist Vision, supra note 68, at 14. 
 74. See infra Part III.A. 
 75. TRIPS, supra note 54, arts. 62.1, 62.2. 
 76. In comparison to much of the rest of international public law, the compulsory dispute 
settlement system and the inability of countries to “pick and choose” among WTO obligations may be 
seen as “elevat[ing] the importance of public international law generally.” James Cameron & Kevin R. 
Gray, Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 248, 
249 (2001). However, these characteristics also remove WTO obligations from the reach of flexibility 
analysis theorized in that field. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Flexibility in International Agreements, 
in International Law and International Relations: Taking Stock 175–96 (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark 
A. Pollack eds., 2012) (analyzing non-substantive methods of exercising flexibilities in international 
law in formal manners—such as the use of reservations, escape clauses, and withdrawal provisions—
and informal practices—such as “auto-interpretation,” nonparticipation, and noncompliance). 
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withholding preferential treatment in an amount proportional to the 
injury suffered. In an asymmetric twist, the benefits withheld need have 
no connection to the area of the violation. Thus, a member may withhold 
preferential treatment on an industry that does not benefit from the non-
compliant intellectual property laws. There is another theoretical 
justification for this: the intellectual property regime (or any other WTO 
violative measure) will benefit a country as a whole, so it does not matter 
how the punishment is allocated. As a practical matter, an industry that 
does not benefit from deviations from the TRIPS standards but is 
punished for it is more likely to lobby for their change. Just as the 
developing countries negotiated for access to unrelated markets in 
exchange for concessions in the TRIPS negotiations, WTO remedies tie 
intellectual property to trade in a way that clouds attempts to analyze 
patent measures solely in terms of incentives to innovate and access. The 
link between patent flexibilities that violate TRIPS and potential 
retribution in unrelated trade matters may be a fair reflection of the 
increasingly global nature of patent law. All amendments to patent law 
have effects beyond their jurisdiction. 
C. Beyond TRIPS: Multilateral Agreements and TRIPS Plus 
 Trade negotiations, including those related to intellectual property, 
have most recently been conducted outside the bounds of the WTO. 
There are multiple explanations for the movement back to bilateral and 
regional trade agreements, ranging from the structural (the WTO has so 
many participants it is difficult to garner support for changes), to the 
practical (some issues are specific to a regional group or other smaller 
groups of frequent traders), to the cynical (larger countries can better 
manipulate smaller countries in more intimate settings).77 All of these 
have some truth to them. Regardless of the reason, regional trade 
agreements (“RTAs”) have proliferated in the years since the WTO was 
established.78 
 
 77. Another tactical reason to conclude that regional trade agreements harmonize intellectual 
property protection is that in subsequent, large-scale harmonization negotiations, it will be easier for 
countries with whose practices are widespread to argue that others should harmonize “to them.” See 
Neofederalist Vision, supra note 68, at 166 (suggesting that the hard law common to multiple free 
trade agreements should be taken into account by the WTO dispute settlement body when “clarifying 
undefined terms and considering normative issues,” while noting the difficulty of taking 
interpretations that may have been negotiated-for concessions between two parties and applying them 
to other situations). 
 78. See Raymundo Valdés & Runyowa Tavengwa, Intellectual Property Provisions in Regional 
Trade Agreements 7 (WTO, Working Paper No. ERSD-2012-21, 2012). 
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Member countries to the WTO are required to report their regional 
trade agreements to the WTO Secretariat.79 More than three hundred 
regional or bilateral trade agreements were in force in 2012.80 These 
agreements govern many different aspects of trade, and not all of them 
mention intellectual property; of those that do, some do not do more 
than note its importance or requiring stronger protection than is already 
required by TRIPS.81 Nevertheless, there are RTAs that represent a 
negotiation of stronger patent rights in exchange for other trade 
concessions such as greater access to desirable markets. Such strengthened 
provisions—generally called “TRIPS-plus” initiatives—may include rules 
on aspects of patent law left to the states under the TRIPS agreement. 
The free trade agreement between the United States and Morocco, for 
example, requires the parties not to recognize the principle of 
international exhaustion.82 The United States-Oman RTA requires that 
judicial authorities be able to award up to treble damages for patent 
infringement.83 Most common are provisions relating to border measures 
to protect from imports that infringe on patent and other intellectual 
property rights.84 
Another move toward regional harmonization comes from efforts to 
create a European patent and a Unified Patent Court in Europe. The 
 
 79. Requirements are contained in GATT 1994. See General Council Decision, Transparency 
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, WT/L/671 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
 80. See Valdés & Tavengwa, supra note 78, at 7 (finding 351 regional and bilateral trade 
agreements in force in 2012 when goods and services notifications were counted separately; examining 
agreements reported before 2010 in detail); see also WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (suggesting a 
lower number of 319 regional and bilateral agreements in force). 
 81. Valdés & Tavengwa, supra note 78, at 6–7 (finding that 165 of the 194 agreements examined 
had some sort of intellectual property provision, 139 of which were entered into since the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995; further finding that 76 of those contained references to specific 
types of intellectual property and 54 contained pharmaceutical provisions). 
 82. United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.9(4), June 15, 2004; 
Neofederalist Vision, supra note 68, at 149 (discussing TRIPS plus measures). The Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit has considered exhaustion of patent rights to occur “when a patented device 
has been lawfully sold in the United States.” See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 
1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Under this rule, an article patented in the United States but sold elsewhere 
under a license would be considered infringing when imported. This interpretation was reiterated in 
Ninestar Technology Co. v. International Trade Commission, 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1656 (2013). The Supreme Court recently ruled that there is international exhaustion 
in the copyright context. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1371 (2013). That case 
need not affect the common law rule in patent law because it involved statutory interpretation instead 
of the Copyright Act. See id. at 1363–64. 
 83. United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, Jan.1, 2009 art. 15.10.29. 
 84. Valdés & Tavengwa, supra note 78, at 18–19 (explaining that more than ninety percent of the 
studied RTAs involving the United States include reference to enforcement procedures and that 
RTAs involving the United States “have the most extensive provisions relating to border measures,” 
often requiring parties to provide for action by customs authorities in the absence of a formal 
complaint by a rights-holder, something allowed, but not required, by TRIPS). 
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unified system was intended to replace the piecemeal process of 
obtaining and enforcing patents that currently exists. Today, an inventor 
can file applications centrally at the European Patent Office but must 
select the European countries where she seeks protection and 
subsequently enforce rights in the national courts.85 In some states, 
litigation is further fragmented due to the separation of litigation for 
infringement and claims of invalidity.86 The European Parliament 
approved the unitary patent rules.87 The plan for a unitary patent and 
court system is moving forward despite the disagreements that have led 
some countries to drop out88 and the need to make “unitary patent 
protection . . . optional and co-exist[ent] with national and European 
patents.”89 As a result, the so-called unitary system will likely lead to a 
more complex system, at least in the near future, but it may yet serve as a 
stepping-stone toward cohesive and comprehensive unification of patent 
grants and increased enforcement in Europe. 
The movement toward harmonization is undeniable. However, a 
countercurrent has arisen in many developing countries resisting 
international harmonization. The greatest resistance to harmonization in 
developing countries comes in technology areas that impact access to 
medicine. There are also implicitly anti-harmonization views in developed 
countries, in particular where scholars and interest groups suggest tailored 
patent rights as a means to solve the inefficiencies that arise from applying 
a uniform patent law consistently to very different situations. These 
countercurrents manifest in laws directed at specific technology areas and 
in technology-specific interpretations of otherwise uniform laws. 
III.  De Facto Flexibility 
Despite significant strides toward harmonization in the years 
following the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement, unification is not in 
sight. Opportunities for more harmonization have been accompanied by 
countercurrents of diversity and flexibility that slow attempts to treat all 
 
 85. 2 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 45.2 (2009). 
 86. In Germany, for example, infringement claims are brought and litigated in court as private 
law issues, while challenges to patent validity are considered public law questions and are initially 
decided by the German Federal Patent Court. See M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent 
Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 299, 334 (2006). 
 87. Press Release, European Parliament, Parliament Approves EU Unitary Patent Rules (Dec. 
11, 2012).  
 88. Spain and Italy are opting out because the approved languages—German, French, and 
English—don’t include their official languages.  
 89. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Implementing 
Enhanced Coooperation in the Area of the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, Explanatory 
Memorandum, COM (2011) 215 final (Apr. 13, 2011).  
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subject matter equally, from patent grant to enforcement. In addition to 
legislative tailoring measures—flexibility by design—there are variations 
in how patent law is applied to different technologies and entities that 
cannot be eliminated.90 These differences are easiest to explain for 
common law countries, where in theory the law is painted with broad 
brush strokes and the courts fill in the details. This allows for (often 
slow) legal evolution to meet unforeseen situations through derivations 
from old principles to new rules. In reality, courts in countries with civil 
law perform the same function to varying degrees.91 As a result, identical 
laws may evolve divergently as they are applied to new factual situations. 
In addition, when a single law is meant to apply identically in different 
forums, courts can always come to different conclusions on questions of 
fact or of mixed fact and law.92 
Regardless of a given regime’s position on harmonization, patent 
laws include tailoring mechanisms in both developing and industrialized 
countries. Flexibility exists in global patent law, and it is used both in 
design and application. Examples from the United States and India—
countries of differing development but similar engagement in intellectual 
property law—are described in the Subparts that follow, with particular 
emphasis on the purposes of the flexibility, the method of implementation, 
and the breadth of stakeholder participation. 
 
 90. Carroll, supra note 3, at 1401–06 (explaining that U.S. patent law is not unitary in fact, looking 
first to tailored legislative measures, but also judicial interpretations and administrative treatment by 
the PTO to show how different industries may be granted rights that differ in substance if not in form). 
 91. Though continental Europe is primarily governed by civil law, the difficulty of writing a legal 
code that anticipates all situations is apparent. One example is the treatment that national courts have 
given to requests for permanent injunctions on patents that are essential to a standard (such as those 
dictating technical specifications for DVD players) and to a defense based on competition law, which 
is implemented across the European Union. In these cases, defendants who are found to infringe 
essential patents argue that there can be no permanent injunction under the theory that a plaintiff may 
not request that which he would have to return upon its grant. Because holders of standards-essential 
patents must agree to license them on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (“FRAND”), 
infringers have argued that a permanent injunction should not issue; the patent holder would have to 
immediately start licensing the patent and thus the injunction would be moot. German courts accepted 
this argument in the “Orange Book” decision, denying an injunction for this reason. 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 6, 2009, KZR 39/06 (Ger.). Dutch courts 
disagreed with the German interpretation of the interplay of laws, deciding that until a patent was 
actually licensed, there was no ground for allowing the defendant use of the patented technology. Rb. 
Den Haag 17 Maart 2010, 316533 / HA ZA 08-2522 en 316535 / HA ZA 08-2524 (Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics N.V./ SK Kassetten GmbH & Co. KG) (Neth.). 
 92. Such divergence occurs within countries, too. In the United States, for example, there is the 
possibility of different validity decisions from the U.S. PTO and district courts or different decisions 
from district courts and the U.S. International Trade Commission (the “ITC”). Although federal court 
decisions are binding on the ITC, the converse is not true. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent 
Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 529, 538–39 (2009). 
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A. Flexibility by Design 
History reveals a number of movements that have tailored patent 
law to different technologies. Before the TRIPS Agreement imposed the 
requirement that patents be available in all areas of technology without 
discrimination, these movements sometimes resulted in specific legislative 
or administrative measures that did just that. The TRIPS Agreement 
nevertheless permits some flexibility, encompassing explicit exceptions to 
the uniform grant and treatment of patent rights as well as interpretations 
of the agreement that allow for variations. Before the WTO came into 
existence, the United States implemented the Patent Term Restoration 
Act (the “Hatch-Waxman Act”) in 1984. As a result, countries generally 
presumed that its terms were consistent with TRIPS.93 Nevertheless, it 
represents a legislative tailoring of exclusive rights that are relatively rare 
in the United States, where tailoring is generally accomplished through 
the judiciary.94 Passage of the TRIPS Agreement required India to 
strengthen the rights granted by its patent law in dramatic ways. In 
implementing new laws, however, developing countries such as India have 
sought to exploit the flexibilities that they perceive in the agreement 
through its criteria for patent eligibility and in its awards of compulsory 
licenses. 
In the United States, as in other countries, there are various 
legislative measures that tailor patent rights to specific technologies.95 
These sui generis types of protection have most often arisen for 
technologies that might not fit patent eligibility criteria but are judged to 
warrant protection. They also predate the TRIPS Agreement, but have 
since been incorporated into it because they are common to many 
countries. The most notable example of a legislative tailoring measure 
covers pharmaceutical inventions. Although it is a field that fits squarely 
into patent eligible technology, the law adds to the patent term with what 
Rebecca Eisenberg has called “pseudo-patent” protection.96 This was the 
bargain struck between legislators of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which, 
through grants of market exclusivity following patent expiration 
essentially alters the duration of the patent term on pharmaceutical 
 
 93. See Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 62–64; see also Panel Report, Canada—
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000). The WTO found 
Canada’s similar provision consistent with TRIPS, but held that a further provision allowing generic 
companies to produce “stockpiles” of drugs in anticipation of the patent expiration was inconsistent. 
Id. 
 94. See infra Part III.B. 
 95. In addition to the Hatch-Waxman Act, discussed infra, some laws grant patent-like protection 
to plants. Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2006). Congress has also 
legislated sui generis protection for semiconductors. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 
17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14 (2000). 
 96. See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 359. 
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products.97 This legislation transformed the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (“FDA”) main role from ensuring the safety and 
efficacy of pharmaceutical products before they enter the market to a 
“market gatekeeper in ways that might be better understood in terms of 
innovation policy, calibrating the balance of costs and incentives for both 
innovating firms and generic competitors.”98 Furthermore, the Hatch-
Waxman Act balances the varied interests of patent-holding drug 
manufacturers, companies that manufacture generic drugs, and the 
patient population through a complex regulatory scheme that includes 
the grant of additional market exclusivity to patent holders, as well as a 
short term of semi-exclusivity to second-movers, encouraging challenges 
to weak patents and early entry by generic companies following the 
expiration of valid patents.99 
Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry differs from other areas 
both in characteristics inherent to the field of technology and in the 
complex regulatory framework in which it operates. Pharmaceutical 
products are typically easy to reverse engineer, making this a field where 
innovation is easily appropriated absent legal protection.100 Drug 
development is a long process, but patents are typically filed and issued 
early in the development process, which reduces the eventual period of 
exclusive use.101 In addition, before they are allowed to enter the market, 
firms must satisfy FDA requirements by showing that new chemical 
entities are safe and effective.102 These requirements are time and money-
intensive; in the early 1980s, they applied to all firms that wanted to 
market a drug, not just the patent-holding “pioneer” drug developers.103 
 
 97. In addition to extending the term of exclusivities granted to patent holders, the protections 
offered by the Hatch-Waxman Act also provide pseudo-patent protection on drugs that otherwise do 
not meet the patentability criteria, because unpatented drugs may sometimes receive market 
exclusivity. Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: the New Frontier of FDA Regulation for 
Genetic Materials, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 1399, 145051 (2013) (explaining that drugs receiving FDA 
approval as “new chemical entities” block FDA review of Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
attempting to piggyback on the pioneer drug’s data the subsequent five years, even if the pioneer drug 
is unpatented or off-patent).  
 98. See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 3, at 1581–82 (discussing characteristics of 
pharmaceutical discoveries that make patent protection important to the industry). The biotech 
industry serves as a counter-example. Methods of producing biopharmaceutical products are less 
amenable to reverse engineering and may therefore be kept as trade secrets. 
 101. See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348–49. 
 102. Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the 
Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 Food Drug 
Cosm. L.J. 269, 273 (1985) (detailing the 1962 FDA requirements for approval of all new drugs based 
on a showing of safety and efficacy). 
 103. Data submitted to the FDA by the pioneer drug company was kept confidential and not 
available for use by subsequent applicants. Id. at 275–76. 
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Thus, prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic medicines were too often 
not developed or brought to market because of the prohibitive cost. 
Unlike patent holders, generic drug companies could not count on future 
monopoly profits to offset these costs. Additionally, the necessary tests 
were considered to infringe, so even when there was sufficient incentive 
to bring a generic drug to market, the process was delayed, which 
effectively allowed a patented drug to continue in its monopoly position 
beyond the patent term.104 Partly as a result of FDA requirements, patent-
holding pharmaceutical companies complained of shortened periods of 
market exclusivity, while generic pharmaceutical manufacturers 
complained of the high costs of regulatory review and difficulty of entering 
the market soon after patent expiration. In addition, consumers suffered 
from limited access to generic products (with their attendant lower 
prices) and FDA resources were wasted because reviews of generic drugs 
that were duplicative of the tests required for the patented drugs.105 
The resulting law allowed for an extension (or “restoration”) of the 
patent term to make up for time spent seeking regulatory approval for 
pioneer drugs.106 At the same time, the Hatch-Waxman Act established 
abbreviated review and approval processes for generic drugs based on 
their demonstrated equivalency to already-approved drugs.107 To further 
facilitate entry of generic drugs following patent expiration, the law 
provided that manufacture and use of patented drugs would not be 
considered infringement when undertaken for the purposes of regulatory 
approval for sale following expiration of the patent.108 The overlapping 
laws and regulations governing patent rights, market exclusivity, and the 
approval process for pioneer and generic drugs are myriad. However, it 
is clear that many interests were at stake and represented in the outcome. 
The structural and participatory elements of the process are also evident, 
both in the outcome and in the legislative process. 
Drafting negotiations reflected the various interests at stake, 
including innovative and imitative pharmaceutical companies and patient 
 
 104. H.R. Rep. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686. See Brief for 
Knowledge Ecology Int’l as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 2–3, FTC v. Watson Pharms., 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2013) (No. 12-416), sub nom FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) 
(discussing the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
 105. H.R. Rep. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686. 
 106. Section 201 of the Hatch-Waxman Act governs patent term restoration. 35 U.S.C. § 156 
(2011) (allowing for restoration of patent term for patented products or methods that have been 
subject to regulatory review). 
 107. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006); see also Eli Lilly & Co. 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (explaining the abbreviated approval process and 
interpreting the act to exclude from infringement medical devices made and used for the purposes of 
obtaining FDA approval). 
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006). 
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advocates. The congressional record shows that the primary participants 
in negotiations were the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association 
and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“Pharma”).109 The 
bill was supported by various unions and the American Association of 
Retired Persons, who favored the possible savings from cheaper generic 
drugs.110 The parties disagreed about many aspects of the proposal,111 as 
might be expected with significant stakeholder involvement. The Hatch-
Waxman Act has been criticized for its substance and complex provisions 
that have allowed for opportunistic behavior.112 It also provided a 
separate forum for lobbying so that the drug industry could look for 
increasing market exclusivity measures through FDA-implemented 
legislation without fighting the inertia of the patent system or having its 
needs weighed against that of other industries. The “pseudo patent 
protection” offered by the Hatch-Waxman Act and the attendant 
overlapping legislation represents one of the largest legislative departures 
from uniform protection for all types of technologies in recent history. It 
has been widely adopted by other countries and, perhaps in part because it 
predated the TRIPS Agreement, it has been found not to violate the 
Article 27 prohibition against discrimination based on field of invention.113 
Other countries have also engaged in recent and significant efforts 
to tailor patent law. In the years since the TRIPS Agreement was 
negotiated and implemented, India has sought to exploit perceived 
flexibilities to pursue its policy goals rather than adopt patent laws that 
mirror those of developed countries.114 India was one of the strongest 
voices on the side of developing countries during the negotiations of the 
TRIPS Agreement because of the growing needs of its patient 
population, its economic difficulty filling those needs, and its strong 
 
 109. H.R. Rep. 98-857, pt. 1, at 4. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (noting objections from Gerald Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, to 
aspects of the bill and objections from some innovator drug companies that the bill would “hamper 
innovation and research, create unnecessary litigation and unconstitutionally take property from 
patent owners”). 
 112. See, e.g., Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug 
Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. Legis. 21 
(2002) (arguing that legal and marketing strategies by pioneer pharmaceutical companies have 
thwarted the goals of the legislation); Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-
Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 
185, 195 (2005) (describing how pharmaceutical companies strategically listed numerous patents for 
each approved drug to garner longer terms of market exclusivity and how generic companies accepted 
anti-competitive settlement agreements to stay off the market, and discussing the extent to which 
reforms solved these problems). 
 113. See, e.g., Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra note 17. 
 114. Kapczynski, supra note 63, at 1573–74 (explaining that while many developing countries have 
adopted strict intellectual property laws, India “has instead mapped out an extraordinary array of 
TRIPS flexibilities, some of which are unknown elsewhere in the world”). 
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generic drug industry.115 Implementation of flexibilities has focused on 
standards of patentability and the scope of protection granted because of 
the TRIPS Agreement’s prohibition on discrimination with respect to 
field of invention.116 Thus, the Indian patent law now allows patenting of 
pharmaceutical products but excludes from the definition of invention 
“the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the 
mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known 
substance.”117 The statutory definition of invention in India’s section 3(d) 
stands in contrast to the common law rule in the United States that new 
uses of a known substance may indeed be patented.118 It also stands in 
 
 115. According to the World Health Organization’s Country Cooperation Strategy brief on India, 
India accounts for twenty-one percent of the world’s global burden of disease. World Health Org., 
Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance: India (2012). The total expenditure on health per capita 
in India in 2010 constituted four percent of GDP that year, the majority of which was out of pocket. Id. 
 116. Cynthia M. Ho, Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements 
on Patents and Related Rights 91 (2011). Although India’s patent laws under British rule allowed 
for pharmaceutical patents, India subsequently prohibited patents on pharmaceutical compounds, 
from 1970 until it was required to under TRIPS in 2005. See V.K. Unni, Symposium, Indian Patent 
Law and TRIPS: Redrawing the Flexibility Framework in the Context of Public Policy and Health, 
25 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 323, 327–28, 333 (2012) (explaining that under the 1970 
law, India allowed short patent terms for processes of making pharmaceutical products; processes 
which are trivial to design around). Although India was not required by TRIPS to grant patents on 
pharmaceutical products until 2005, it was required to accept applications earlier for later processing 
and granting of exclusive marketing rights under some circumstances, followed by a grant of the 
remaining patent term. This transitional provision of TRIPS is known as “the Mailbox Rule,” and its 
precise requirements spurred WTO litigation by the United TRIPS, supra note 54, art. 70.8(a); see also 
Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) (holding that the required means of filing applications must 
include allocation of filing and priority dates in addition to preserving novelty and priority as of those 
dates). 
 117. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India) (as amended by The Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, section 3(d), Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India)). The section is 
followed by an explanation that “salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, 
isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known substance shall 
be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties with regards to 
efficacy.” Id.  
 118. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2011) (“‘[P]rocess’ means . . . a new use of a known . . . composition of 
matter, or material.”). However, the Indian law may be providing a model for other developing 
countries, as Thailand and Argentina are considering similar provisions. See Shan Kohli, Section 3(d) 
Equivalent in the Offing for Thailand . . ., SPICY IP Blog (Nov. 02, 2011, 4:21 AM), 
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2011/11/section-3d-equivalent-in-offing-for.html (noting that Thailand is 
considering a similar provision); Shouvik Kumar Guha, Argentina goes the 3(d) Way: Creases of Worry 
for the Pharmaceutical Patent Applicants?, SPICY IP Blog (May 23, 2012, 10:25 PM), 
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2012/05/argentina-goes-3d-way-creases-of-worry.html (stating that 
Argentina is considering a similar provision). It appears that developed countries are fighting back by 
including provisions requiring that new forms of known substances be considered patentable 
regardless of efficacy in regional trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific partnership. See, e.g., 
Doctors Without Borders, How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Threatens Access to 
Medicines: TPP Issue Brief 3 (Sept. 2011). 
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contrast with United States patent law by specifically denoting 
obviousness requirements for new forms of known substances, rather 
than allowing the patent office and courts to apply the same standards to 
all applications.119 The Indian law thus pins the patentability of new 
“forms”120 of chemicals on their efficacy. However, there is no further 
definition of efficacy in the statute. Instead, the Indian Patent Office 
interpreted it first121 when it denied Novartis’s patent to the cancer-
fighting drug Glivec. In the most high profile case to date, the Indian 
Patent Office found that Glivec did not have a significantly different 
efficacy from other known substances, despite the improvement it 
provided in absorption.122 The Supreme Court of India recently upheld 
the decision.123 In its holding, the Court stated that it had “no doubt that 
the ‘therapeutic efficacy’ of a medicine must be judged strictly and 
narrowly” and suggested two interpretations that would significantly 
narrow the exception.124 First, the Court interpreted the statute so that it 
would never allow “salts, esters, ethers,” and other listed substances to 
demonstrate increased efficacy.125 Next, the Court narrowly defined 
therapeutic efficacy to exclude bioavailability, thermodynamic stability, 
and other characteristics that one might commonly associate with an 
improved drug.126 The decision indicates a willingness by the patent office 
and the courts to apply the exclusion vigorously and limit the exception 
 
 119. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc. 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (invalidating a 
patent under the theory of inherent anticipation). 
 120. The statute explains that different forms of known substances will include “salts, esters, 
ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, particles, i.e., isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations, 
and other derivatives of known substance.” The Patents Act, No. 39, section 3(d) (India). 
 121. See Ho, supra note 116, at 93–94 (discussing the Novartis case and criticizing the law for 
requiring the patent office to make efficacy determinations when the data to prove it will likely not yet 
exist and because patent examiners do not have the type of resources or expertise that agencies, such 
as food and drug agencies, that typically make such determinations have). The lack of evidence may 
not have been an issue in the Novartis case because that application was filed in 1997 and held by the 
patent office under the mailbox rule; it was rejected during a pre-grant opposition during the 
examination which only started in 2005. See generally Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2007) 4 M.L.J. 
1153 (India). 
 122. Id. The appellate court upheld the decision, holding that section 3(d) was not unconstitutional 
for being vague, arbitrary, and conferring uncontrolled discretion on the Patent Controller. See 
Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2013 __S.C.R.__ at para 5(c) (No. 2706-2716) (Apr. 1, 2013) (India), 
available at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40212. 
 123. Id. at 57 (explaining that section 3(d) “clearly sets up a second tier of qualifying standards for 
chemical substances/pharmaceutical products in order to leave the door open for true and genuine 
inventions but, at the same time, to check any attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the 
patent term on spurious grounds[,]” thereby suggesting that 3(d) sets a higher threshold for the 
definition of an invention). 
 124. Id. at 91. 
 125. Id. at 90–91. 
 126. Id. 
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for significant increases in efficacy.127 It does not provide clear guidance 
as to how the provisions will operate in future cases; for example, the 
Court advances contrasting interpretations of the statute but does not 
choose among them, suggesting instead that either would yield the same 
results; while true in this case, it is unhelpful to those seeking guidance 
for future cases.128 
India has implemented another tailoring measure through its 
provisions for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing occurs when a 
government uses or grants authorization for another to use the subject 
matter of a patent absent consent from the patent holder. Such 
compulsory licensing is allowed under Article 31 of TRIPS.129 But one 
could argue that compulsory licensing is not a true tailoring measure as it 
was in the India Patent Act of 1970.130 
In addition, compulsory licensing was allowed by the Paris 
Convention under certain conditions.131 In this sense, the right to 
implement compulsory licensing is only a flexibility inasmuch as it 
represents a deviation from an absolute right of exclusion, not as a 
deliberate attempt to counter harmonization. Nonetheless, although 
compulsory licenses may be important in acting as safety valves and 
assuring a patent-wary population that rights are not absolute, until 
recently the global use of compulsory licenses has been remarkably 
infrequent. India’s uses of the provision may reflect changes in policy. In 
March 2012, India issued a compulsory license, pursuant to section 84 of 
the India Patent Act, for the cancer-fighting drug Nexavar (generically, 
 
 127. See Ho, supra note 116, at 94 (noting that determinations of efficacy in other jurisdictions are 
typically made by agencies like the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in the context of the 
effectiveness—and safety—of a drug for market approval purposes). 
 128. See, e.g., Novartis AG, 4 M.L.J. at 94 (indicating that “whatever way therapeutic efficacy may 
be interpreted,” the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate did not meet the standard); id. at 95 
(“Thus, in whichever way section 3(d) may be viewed, whether as setting up the standards of 
‘patentability’ or as an extension of the definition of ‘invention’, it must be held . . . [the drug] fails the 
test of section 3(d), too, of the Act”). 
 129. TRIPS, supra note 54, art. 70.8(a) (setting parameters for compulsory licensing, such as 
requirements that the proposed user has attempted to obtain a license—except in cases of national 
emergency, that authorizations should be done on an individual basis and be limited in scope, that the 
decision must be reviewable in court, and that adequate remuneration be paid, inter alia). 
 130. In fact, India previously had a system of “licenses of right” for patents on foods and 
medicines, under which those who sought licenses from patent holders but could not come to mutually 
agreeable terms could apply to the Controller of patents who would hold a hearing and decide license 
terms, which, by statute, were not to exceed “four percent of the ex-factory sale price in bulk of the 
patented article.” The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, sections 86–88, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). 
These provisions have not applied following the 2005 amendments. Licenses of right would violate the 
requirement in Article 31 of TRIPS that any compulsory license be individually evaluated, among 
other requirements. See TRIPS, supra note 54. 
 131. Paris Convention, supra note 43, art. 5. 
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sorafenib), manufactured by Bayer.132 The head of the Indian Patent and 
Trademark Office—the Controller of Patents—issued the compulsory 
license to Natco Pharma Ltd., an Indian generic drug manufacturer, after 
finding that only two percent of the patient population was served by 
Bayer, the price of the drug was not “reasonably affordable,” and Bayer 
did not sufficiently “work” the patent in India.133 The Intellectual 
Property Appellate Board upheld the decision on those same grounds, 
and it was appealed to the high court.134 The price difference is striking: 
Bayer’s brand name drug sold for approximately $5,181 per month, 
whereas Natco Pharma, the Indian generic pharmaceutical company that 
sought the license, will sell it for approximately $160 per month.135 
In the spring of 2013, India took steps toward issuance of 
compulsory licenses for three more cancer drugs.136 India’s compulsory 
licensing, like its exclusion of certain types of chemicals from 
patentability, is a legislative patent law flexibility applied through 
administrative procedures. The process behind the laws reflects the full-
throated support for Indian industry and consumers that was evident in 
the India Patent Law of 1970.137 The approach also reflects the more 
 
 132. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, section 84. The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative responded to the move in Special 301 Report. See Ambassador Ronald Kirk, Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2012 Special 301 Report (2012). 
 133. Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India Orders Bayer to License a Patented Drug, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 13, 2012, at B; Shamnad Basheer, Breaking News: India’s First Compulsory License Granted!, 
SPICY IP Blog (Mar. 12, 2012, 1:27 PM), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2012/03/breaking-news-indias-
first-compulsory.html. Note that any of these three conditions would be sufficient to support a 
compulsory licensing decision. 
 134. Rumman Ahmed, India Appeals Body Rejects Bayer’s Plea on Nexavar, Wall St. J. Online 
(Mar. 4, 2013) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324178904578340013954624212.html. In 
its decision, the Appellate Board quoted the Iyengar Committee Report to emphasize that patent 
rights are in the interest of the national economy as opposed to the inventor and are therefore subject 
to the public interest. See Sai Vinod, Guest Post: Eye Witness Account of India’s First Compulsory 
License Appeal Before the IPAB [Part I], SPICY IP Blog (Mar. 8, 2013, 4:15 PM), 
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2013/03/guest-post-eye-witness-account-of.html. 
 135. Ahmed, supra note 134. 
 136. See G. Pramod Kumar, India’s Cancer Burden: Why the Govt’s CL Ruling Is so Important, 
Firstpost.India, Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.firstpost.com/india/indias-cancer-burden-why-the-govts-cl-
ruling-is-so-important-589051.html (lauding government plans to issue compulsory licenses for 
trastuzumab—the patent for which is due to expire in 2014—dasatinib, and ixabepilone); Kevin 
Grogan, India to Issue Compulsory Licenses on Roche, B-MS Drugs, PharmaTimes, Jan. 15, 2013, 
http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/13-01-15/India_to_issue_compulsory_licences_on_Roche_B-
MS_drugs.aspx; Divya Rajagopal, Compulsory Licence Likely for Three Cancer Drugs, Econ. Times, 
Jan. 14, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-01-14/news/36331897_1_compulsory-
licence-indian-patent-act-patent-controller. 
 137. See V.K. Unni, supra note 116, at 327–28 (noting that the Ayyangar Report that informed 
much of the 1970 patent law suggested designing the law “with special reference to the economic 
conditions of the country,” and arguing that through enactment of the law, “the Indian government 
made a conscious decision to kick-start the lagging Indian economy by supporting domestic drug 
manufacturing”). 
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measured approach that sought to comply with the new requirements of 
TRIPS while not relinquishing more than was necessary in the 2005 
amendments.138 In both instances, the Indian Patent Office determined 
how to implement the flexibility in ways that showed a willingness to 
stride boldly into matters of policy. 
B. Flexibility in Application 
While legislative tailoring accounts for some variations in the 
treatment of different technologies or situations, the factual circumstances 
associated with different technologies sometimes beg different results, 
even through the application of uniform law. Moreover, the iterative and 
evolving nature of the common law in particular allows for changes in 
treatment of different technologies over time.139 In the United States, 
flexibility in application has been the primary means when tailoring 
patent law.140 
In a series of articles and a book, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley 
describe ways courts in the United States apply varied standards to the 
patent cases before them in different industries. They also argue that this 
tailoring can—and should—be undertaken in furtherance of patent 
policy objectives and suggest other means of implementing such tailoring 
to solve inefficiencies associated with uniformity.141 Burk and Lemley 
propose that the uniformity costs associated with technology-neutral 
protection may be significantly minimized through judicial tailoring or 
“deliberate modulation” of patent laws to different industries.142 Some 
tailoring evolves due to the repeated application of a seemingly uniform 
standard to different fields. Thus, the standard “person having ordinary 
skill in the art,” invoked to determine whether a claimed invention is 
 
 138. See Prashant Reddy, The Political Economy of the Current Round of Compulsory Licensing in 
India, SPICY IP Blog (Jan. 16, 2013, 1:19 AM), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2013/01/the-political-
economy-of-current-round.html (“The present round of compulsory licencing . . . is widely seen as the 
fruits of a sustained lobbying effort by the generic pharmaceutical lobby.”). 
 139. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 140. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 51, 53 
(2010) (“[T]he common law has been the dominant legal force in the development of U.S. patent law 
for over two hundred years.”); see also Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex 
Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 Duke L.J. 1237, 1265 (2012). 
 141. See e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley 
Tech L.J. 1155 (2003) (arguing that courts apply a lower standard of nonobviousness to biotechnology 
patents while imposing stricter enablement and written description requirements, while, in contrast, 
loosening enablement and best mode requirements for software patents); Burk & Lemley, supra note 
3 (arguing that technology-specific tailoring through the courts is desirable); The Patent Crisis, supra 
note 3.  
 142. The Patent Crisis, supra note 3, at 102. 
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invalid because it is obvious,143 whether a granted patent disclosed the 
best mode of practicing the invention, and whether the invention was 
enabled through the patent disclosure has evolved differently in different 
fields.144 In this instance, the divergent application of uniform law affects 
how easy it is to receive a patent (or defend a granted patent’s validity) 
and how broad the scope of a patent will be.145 The decisions affecting 
patent eligibility reflect societal values and moral judgments about the 
limits of control and possession of natural phenomena and beings. In 
addition, they reflect the value that society places on future innovation 
and concerns it has about the possible adverse affects the approval of 
broad patents would have on natural phenomena and innovation. The 
most recent Court decision affecting patent remedies was aimed at 
tailoring the scope of patent rights to increase efficiency; however, the 
purpose of this decision includes underlying policy preferences about 
balancing access against innovation.146 
While rules affecting remedies may greatly affect the value of 
patents, a rule excluding a technology field from patent eligibility 
removes it from the exclusive-rights-for-innovation scheme entirely. 
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty—holding that a genetically engineered bacterium was 
patentable—is viewed as largely responsible for the growth and 
dominance of the U.S. biotechnology industry.147 Chakrabarty expressed 
the general understanding that patents are meant to be available for 
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”148 Indeed, the United 
States Patent Act states that a patent shall be granted to “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof” 
subject to other limitations.149 Nevertheless, there are limits to what is 
patent eligible. There is controversy around the patent eligibility of living 
organisms, mathematical algorithms, business methods, and the meaning 
 
 143. The Supreme Court moved to an obviousness standard based on the skills and knowledge of a 
person having ordinary skill in the art in 2007. KSR Int’l Corp. v. Teleflex Corp., 550 U.S. 398, 419 
(2007). 
 144. Burk & Lemley, supra note 141, at 1165–84 (discussing the high level of skill expected from a 
person of ordinary skill in software and the low level of skill expected from a person of ordinary skill 
in biotechnology-related fields). 
 145. Id. at 1184–87. 
 146. See infra notes 163175and accompanying text. 
 147. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (upholding Chakrabarty’s patent on a 
bacterium genetically modified to break down the components of crude oil); see John M. Golden, 
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American 
System, 50 Emory L.J. 101, 106–07 (2001). 
 148. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; see also S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 2395 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 
82-1923 (1952). 
 149. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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and scope of the areas excluded from patent eligibility: laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.150 The Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Mayo v. Prometheus and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics raise the potential harm to future innovations of granting patents 
on broad scientific principles.151 In addition, both cases address 
technological areas that impact public health.152 
In Mayo, the Court held that a claimed method of optimizing the 
use of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases while minimizing 
unwanted side-effects was ineligible for patent protection.153 The claimed 
process was based on correlations between metabolite levels produced 
by the drugs in individual patients and the toxicity and efficacy of the 
drugs.154 The patents at issue claimed a process for administering the drug 
to a patient, determining the resulting metabolite levels in the patient’s 
blood, and using those levels to determine future dose adjustments.155 
The Court reiterated the purpose of excluding “[p]henomena of nature, 
. . . mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts” from patent 
eligibility—because they are scientific tools, and extending protection 
would impede, rather than promote, innovation156—before finding that 
 
 150. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853)). The Court went on to give examples of 
unpatentable subject matter, such as “a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the 
wild,” the formula E = MC2, or the law of gravity, understanding these as “‘manifestations of . . . nature, 
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’” Id. (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 441). The Supreme 
Court has shown a recent interest in cases relating to patent-eligibility in these areas. In Bilski v. Kappos, 
the Court affirmed that business methods are eligible for patents, but suggested that they may still be 
suspect for vagueness. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228–29 (2010). In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), the Court invalidated a claim under the “law of nature” 
exclusion. The Court recently addressed the exclusion of living organisms in Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). In addition to these cases, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit recently issued an en banc decision discussing the appropriate test to determine 
whether “a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible ‘abstract idea.’” CLS Bank Int’l v. 
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g 
granted, opinion vacated, 484 Fed. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). In a plurality opinion, the court 
invalidated the claims before it and drew from Supreme Court precedent to suggest “guideposts” for a 
framework that “turns primarily on the practical likelihood of a claim preempting a fundamental 
concept” and might apply to technologies beyond the “computer-implemented inventions presented in 
this case.” CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
 151. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1292; Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. 
 152. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1292; Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. 
 153. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1289. 
 154. Id. at 1295.  
 155. Id. at 1290–91. 
 156. Id. at 1292 (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67). The Court continues, explaining that “there is 
a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised upon 
them, a danger that becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more than an instruction to 
‘apply the natural law.’” Id. at 1301–02 (citing Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1315 (2011)). 
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the claimed processes were not patent-eligible applications of natural 
laws.157 To make its decision, the Court considered the views of the 
government,158 members of the medical diagnostic community,159 and 
members of the medical practice community.160 It responded to the 
submissions from industry by noting that “we must hesitate before 
departing from established general legal rules lest a new protective rule 
that seems to suit the needs of one field produce unforeseen results in 
another.”161 Mayo concerned the biotechnology industry, which thought 
that the decision might result in significant exclusions from patent 
protection. However, the PTO issued guidelines to its examiners that 
also provided guidance to the industry as to what examiners considered 
to be patent eligible. Although the Court has the final say, the agency’s 
interpretation provides some level of certainty to the industry, at least in 
the short term.162 
Myriad similarly raises the issues of line-drawing between describing 
natural phenomena and scientific discovery,163 in addition to questions 
about how best to grant incentives for innovation in medical diagnosis 
 
 157. Id. at 1294. 
 158. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150) (arguing that the 
subject matter was sufficiently applied to be patent-eligible, but that the patents were likely invalid 
under the novelty and nonobviousness requirements of the patent act and further arguing that the 
claims would not preempt other practical applications of the correlation described). 
 159. See, e.g., Brief for the Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150) (arguing that patent protection for medical 
processes involving pharmaceuticals has spurred innovation and that a ruling of patent ineligibility will 
undercut incentives for innovation); see also Brief for the Biotech. Indus. Org. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 1–2, Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150) (arguing that the 
biotechnology industry is “uniquely dependent on predictable and effective patent protection for the 
development of new technologies” and promoting patent eligibility for inventions in the biotechnology 
sector). 
 160. Brief for the AARP & Pub. Patent Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150) (arguing that patents claiming medical 
correlations inhibit doctors’ ability to diagnose and treat patients and result in higher costs and lower 
access to health services). 
 161. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1305 (further noting the role of Congress “in crafting 
more finely tailored rules where necessary” and refusing to decide the policy question of whether 
“increased protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable”). 
 162. Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, to 
Patent Examining Corps, 2012 Interim Procedure for Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis of Process 
Claims Involving Laws of Nature 3 (July 3, 2012) available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/ 
2012_interim_guidance.pdf (laying out a test of process claims involving natural principles to see 
whether “additional elements or steps [are included that] relate to the natural principle in a significant 
way to impose a meaningful limit on the claim scope. The analysis turns on whether the claim has 
added enough to show a practical application.”). 
 163. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116–17 (2013). 
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and treatment without deterring downstream innovation.164 The Court 
held that merely isolating naturally occurring DNA sequences does not 
make them patent eligible; however, claims to “cDNA” are patent 
eligible because that protein is not naturally occurring.165 The opinion 
offers a bright line rule in the limited context of the type of genetic 
research at issue.166 Its application to future types of medical research is 
unclear.167 The patents at issue covered genes that Myriad isolated, and 
then discovered that mutations on those genes correlate with increased 
risks of breast and ovarian cancer.168 Because the subject of the claims is 
human DNA, the case also raises moral issues about the limits of legal 
entitlement to material that exists naturally in human beings.169 The 
petitioners that challenged the validity of the patents include 
professional associations of pathologists and women’s health 
organizations.170 The views of the government, reflecting advice from 
relevant agencies, were before the Court in the form of an amicus curiae 
brief.171 Other organizations wrote briefs as amicus curiae as well, raising 
additional questions of access to public health,172 arguing that exclusion 
from patent eligibility better serves the purposes of spurring 
innovation,173 representing a religious interpretation of patent 
eligibility,174 or supporting patent eligibility while suggesting other patent 
doctrines as sufficient bars to patents likely to impede innovation.175 
 
 164. Id. at 2116; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398) (“The 
broad preemptive effect of these patents is further evidence that they claim laws and products of 
nature. The patents cover all isolated forms of the naturally-occurring genes, whether previously 
identified or not. The patents grant Myriad the authority to prevent all research and clinical testing of 
the genes, raising the same concerns about patenting a ‘building-block’ that has troubled the Court.”) 
 165. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 166. See Jacob S. Sherkow & Henry T. Greely, The Future of Gene Patents and the Implications for 
Medicine, 173 JAMA Internal Medicine 1569, 1570 (2013) (suggesting that in the short run, the 
Myriad decision means “more competitive markets for diagnostic genetic testing,” for the genes at 
issue in that case, but that “in the long term, probably [it doesn’t mean] very much”).  
 167. Id. 
 168. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398). 
 169. For those who believe that isolated DNA is sufficiently different from naturally occurring 
molecules, there is no moral question, of course. 
 170. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398). 
 171. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 9, Myriad, 133 S. 
Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398) (arguing that isolated DNA should not be patent eligible because it would 
unduly compromise the public’s ability to study and use native DNA, inter alia). 
 172. Brief for the AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 
12-398) (arguing that gene patents impede the ability of patients to obtain medical care—particularly 
patients covered by Medicare and Medicaid). 
 173. Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. 
Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398). 
 174. Brief for the Ethics & Religious Liberty Comm’n of the S. Baptist Convention & Prof. D. 
Brian Scarnecchia as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398) 
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Courts have also adapted legal standards to address newly emergent 
problems that may arise more in technology fields with particular 
characteristics. For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. 
MercExchange and subsequent district court decisions denying 
permanent injunctions following findings of patent infringement were a 
reaction to the emergence of new business models that took advantage of 
increasingly complex technologies and created a drag on innovation.176 
Permanent injunctions were nearly presumed following a finding of 
infringement before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in eBay.177 
However, there was an increase in patents that presented holdup 
opportunities, either because of their broad scope (such as for software 
patents), or because the ever more complex products that characterize the 
information technology sector were covered by numerous overlapping 
patents.178 The concurrent rise in patent suits filed by entities that 
acquired patent portfolios solely for the purpose of seeking licensing fees 
through the threat of lawsuits created pressure to modify the strong 
presumption of an injunction because of the inefficiencies introduced 
into the system through the characteristics of these new industries and 
business models.179 
The Supreme Court in eBay held that there was no “general rule 
that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement 
absent exceptional circumstances,” and instead emphasized the 
importance of weighing each injunction request individually.180 Although 
Chief Justice Roberts authored a concurrence emphasizing that 
 
(arguing that ownership of DNA would upset the fundamental relationships between G-d and 
humanity, and between human beings as understood through various branches of Christian theology). 
 175. Brief for the Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance but 
Supporting Neither Party, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398) (arguing that the claims were drawn to 
isolated DNA that is not found in humans, that patent eligibility should be a low bar with other 
doctrines of patentability providing stricter limits, and that the Court should respect the moral and 
ethical considerations reflected by Congress’ recognition of patent eligibility for isolated DNA). 
 176. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 
1991, 2015 (2007) (explaining that holdup risk is high for complex inventions, particularly when there 
is no reciprocal risk of litigation and that NPEs bring a significant portion of infringement suits in 
industries subject to royalty stacking); see also id. at 2164 (emphasizing that “holdup is recognized as a 
form of market failure that leads to inefficiency, primarily by discouraging what would otherwise be 
socially desirable investments”); Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzija, Compulsory Patent 
Licensing: Is It a Viable Solution in the United States?, 13 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. l. Rev. 509, 510–11 
(2007) (describing new technologies as particularly susceptible to holdup due to “patent thicket,” 
where hundreds of patents are needed for a single product, yet they all overlap and block one 
another). 
 177. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 
388 (2006). 
 178. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 179. Rajec, supra note 3, at 742–48 (detailing the path to eBay). 
 180. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 395–97 (2006) (noting that issuance of 
overbroad patents may affect how courts approach the four-factor test). 
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“[d]iscretion is not whim,” and “that like cases should be decided alike,”181 
four members of the Court were more willing to entertain the idea that 
patent laws might be tailored for different situations.182 Indeed, the district 
court denied an injunction in that case on remand.183 The Court had 
before it briefs from industry184 and academics185 who were concerned 
about holdup from non-practicing entities, as well as from professional 
organizations arguing in favor of a general rule in favor of the grant of 
permanent injunctions.186 Moreover, district courts have interpreted eBay 
such that non-practicing entities are less likely to be awarded an 
injunction than patent holders who practice their patents.187 
The preceding examples show how patent law may be tailored to 
meet particular societal needs, better align with local values, or better 
serve its purpose of incentivizing innovation. Indeed, most of the examples 
satisfy multiple purposes. Although the arguments that support these 
measures may be apparent from their descriptions, legitimate concerns 
underlie the global move toward harmonization, even with its imperative 
of further uniformity in domestic patent laws. These tensions are explored 
and a framework for weighing them is proposed in the Parts that follow. 
 
 181. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 
139 (2005)). 
 182. Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 183. Although the reasoning was not based on a rule that patent holders who do not practice their 
inventions should not be entitled to injunctions, the “market share rule” emerging in the district courts 
following the eBay decision accomplishes much the same as such a rule would, albeit with some logical 
contortions. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 591–92 (E.D. Va. 2007), 
remanded by 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 184. See e.g., Brief of Am. Innovators’ Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25–30, 
eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130); Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. Supporting Petitioner at 5–14, 
eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130); Brief of Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 16–18, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130). 
 185. Brief of 52 Intellectual Prop. Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, eBay, 
547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130). 
 186. Brief of Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n & Fed. Circuit Bar Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Neither Party, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130). 
 187. See, e.g., Rajec, supra note 3, at 751–58 (suggesting that following eBay, courts are using a 
“market share rule” to determine whether a permanent injunction is warranted); see also Andrew 
Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of 
Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 631, 654 (2007) (“[D]irect 
competition . . . appears to be the most significant predictor of whether a permanent injunction will be 
granted.”); Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent 
Remedies, 9 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 543, 549–55 (2008) (suggesting courts use direct competition as a 
means for determining the appropriateness of an injunction); Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in 
the Post-eBay World, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 193, 196–98 (2008) (suggesting that courts “place a heavy 
emphasis” on whether the parties are in “direct competition”). 
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IV.  The Framework 
In order to develop a framework that carries descriptive and 
prescriptive weight, a tailoring measure should be evaluated by the 
degree to which it satisfies the purposes of maintaining flexibility and the 
ways in which it minimizes harm to harmonization interests. Moreover, 
the implementing institutions and degree of stakeholder involvement in 
bargaining provide insight into the likelihood that a given tailoring 
measure will indeed account for these competing values. 
A. Arguments for Harmonization and Arguments for Uniformity 
Proponents of harmonization and uniformity put forth arguments 
that sound in the values of certainty, fairness, and economy. The 
arguments for uniform rules within a patent regime often apply equally 
in the international sphere.188 Such arguments rely on the uncertain 
nature of scientific advancement and the need of investors for certainty 
about the applicable legal regime when investing in uncertain 
technologies. Patents are primarily conceived as property rights, allowing 
a reliance on the ability of private parties to determine the value of an 
invention without regulatory or legislative intervention.189 From this view, 
investments based on the reasonable expectation of patent availability 
should be protected. In addition to arguments in favor of uniform patent 
laws in domestic settings, there are arguments unique to harmonizing 
patent laws among different countries, such as solving free-rider 
problems and encouraging free trade. 
1. Certainty 
Certainty in the law governing innovation is important because the 
nature of innovation is inherently uncertain. Patent law is meant to 
accommodate advances in known fields of scientific endeavor as well as 
those fields that have yet to come into being. If the Patent Office had to 
wait for the legislature to determine whether “the Next Big Thing” was 
 
 188. It is worth noting that minimum requirements will not necessarily result in uniformity of laws. 
In practice, however, countries have not extended protection beyond the levels required by TRIPS, 
except for the regional trade agreements that include “TRIPS plus” measures. See, e.g., Pedro Roffe, 
Quaker Int’l Affairs Programme, Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: the Chile-
USA Free Trade Agreement 2004. These measures are generally attempts to harmonize, not 
attempts to implement longer patent terms. 
 189. The discussion of property versus liability rules in patent law shows that the difficulty in 
valuation of patent rights argues in favor of property rules. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining 
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 Duke L.J. 1, 1, 52–54 (2004) (noting increasing 
propertization of intellectual property law but hailing the limits that the property framework can 
impose); see also The Patent Crisis, supra note 3, at 140; Carroll, supra note 3, at 1396 (summarizing 
but not endorsing the argument that property rules provide lower administrative costs while still 
allowing for private contracting). 
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patent eligible (or form its own policy following administrative 
procedures or wait for a judicial decision), the delays would render the 
grant of lower value to wholly new fields of technology. This would result 
in incentives to engage in incremental innovation, not to pioneer new 
areas. In the United States, therefore, the patent system is meant to 
cover “anything under the sun that is made by man.”190 Although there 
will always be questions at the margins about patent eligibility,191 the 
default rule is patent eligibility for all fields of technology. 
For an innovator considering developing and patenting an invention, 
the value associated with the patent is an important characteristic for 
deciding whether it is worthwhile to make the investment.192 If uncertainty 
exists as to the eligibility of an invention for a patent, the worth of 
investing in development of such an invention should be discounted193—
indeed, Mayo led to some concern as to appropriate arenas for 
investment.194 Fields of scientific research with uncertain patent eligibility 
would receive less initial funding. In this way, uncertainty about the 
availability or extent of patent protection will lead to less investment in 
innovation, particularly in the areas of greatest innovation. Conversely, a 
uniform patent law that applies to all fields of technology, now and in the 
future, can be expected to encourage more investment in innovation. 
Internationally, the increased harmonization required by TRIPS 
allows greater certainty that patent protection is available. It also reduces 
the cost of obtaining knowledge about the parameters of that protection 
because of the minimum levels of protection it requires. Frederick Abbott 
suggests that TRIPS benefits existing innovation-based enterprises 
because it entrenches “existing dominance of these enterprises in 
technology-dependent fields,” but also because companies benefit “from 
the enhancement of their legal security in a wider portion of the world 
 
 190. S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 (1952); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 191. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303 (2012). Originally, the court of 
appeals for Myriad held that the claimed method was eligible for patent protection, using the 
“machine-or-transformation” test. Id. at 1334. Certiorari was sought and the Court granted, vacated, 
and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the case in light of its holding in Mayo. Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114 (2013). The Federal Circuit 
issued another opinion upholding the patent. Id. 
 192. But see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. Econ. Persps. 75 (2005) 
(describing that even after a patent grant, uncertainty remains about the validity and scope of the 
patent until it has been litigated). 
 193. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 Hastings L.J. 65, 70 
(2009). 
 194. See, e.g., Comments of anonymous business leader at GW Law School Round Table on 
implications of Mayo v. Prometheus (May 16, 2012) (suggesting that if a company were considering 
investing in that field of technology following the Supreme Court decision, it would likely reconsider). 
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market.”195 While a structure that reinforces existing dominance of 
particular companies does not fit all the goals of the patent system,196 the 
second suggestion that companies benefit from enhanced legal security 
would apply universally to entrenched and emerging businesses. Certainty 
and security are benefits for companies engaging in innovation on a global 
scale. 
For developing countries, in addition to the reduced incentives to 
innovate associated with a lack of certainty, patentable subject matter 
exceptions and other lowered levels of intellectual property rights could 
lead to reduced trade and foreign direct investment.197 Thus, some 
industrialized countries have suggested that the legal infrastructure of 
TRIPS makes enterprises in developed countries more willing to transfer 
technology to developing countries and also increases direct investment.198 
In addition, industrialized countries suggested that stronger intellectual 
property rights will allow domestic industry in developing countries the 
protections needed to grow.199 This claim appears dubious as it applies to 
the least developed countries. However, it is more likely to be true for 
countries that already have industrial and educational infrastructure. 
Historically, patent laws have developed in parallel with industry, rather 
than leading it. For the least developed countries, where the 
administrative cost of a patent system is itself a burden and infrastructure 
is weak, the suggestion that complex innovation is likely to spring up 
with the passage of strong patent laws falls flat.200 Nonetheless, for 
countries that may be close to transitioning from imitative industries to 
innovative industries, the certainty offered by robust patent laws can 
make investment more attractive. 
 
 195. Frederick M. Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPS: A Challenge for the World Economic 
System, 1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 497, 499 (1998). 
 196. See supra Part I. 
 197. See, e.g., Maskus, supra note 12, at 186–94. 
 198. See Abbott, supra note 195, at 499, 506–07 (describing the argument); see also TRIPS, supra note 
54, art. 66.2 (“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country 
Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.”). 
 199. See Abbott, supra note 195, at 499. Abbott goes on to suggest that “[m]easuring the effects of 
[intellectual property rights] in the economic development process” would require disaggregating 
those rights “from other determinants of economic development,” and suggests that the difficulty of 
that task has “so far precluded meaningful measurement of the role of [intellectual property rights] in 
the economic development process.” Id. at 503–04. 
 200. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization 183 (2004) (suggesting that the idea that poor 
countries will benefit from “having to pay for patents they had been accessing freely” was “as implausible 
as the Mafia telling its victims that the protection money would keep them safe from arson”). 
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2. Fairness 
The fairness argument casts countries with lower levels of 
intellectual property protection as free-riders on members of countries 
with higher levels of protection.201 As John Duffy put it, “externalities 
provide a particularly powerful justification for transnational patent 
harmonization because one nation’s patent law can create a global 
externality.”202 According to this argument, industries in countries with 
strong patent rights bear the costs of research and development. If their 
own country is the only one with strong intellectual property protection, 
those companies must increase prices to recoup their research and 
development costs from domestic consumers. In contrast, manufacturers 
in countries with low levels of patent protection will engage in copying 
with significantly lower development costs.203 As a result, such 
manufacturers will market equivalent products at lower prices. Innovator 
companies will either be priced out of those markets or lower their prices 
significantly to compete. Thus, industry and consumers in low-protection 
countries will benefit from the innovative efforts undertaken by industry 
in high-protection countries, denying them a market to recoup their costs 
and pushing the full cost of innovation onto enterprises and consumers in 
the high-protection countries.204 Diverse levels of patent protection 
thereby set the stage for free-riding behavior and appropriation of work. 
This argument has limited currency under the incentive theory of 
patent protection; its primary appeal comes from natural law and 
contract theory.205 If the incentive to innovate and bring innovation to 
market is the main goal of patent protection, then an analysis of the need 
for harmonization would have to consider whether innovators were 
undercompensated as a result of not reaping the monopoly premium in 
 
 201. Abbott, supra note 55, at 697 (writing prior to the TRIPS agreement and explaining that the 
“intellectual property problem therefore concerns devising a mechanism for protecting industrialized 
country intangible wealth” from appropriation without compensation). 
 202. John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 685, 695 
(2002). 
 203. Of course, this varies among industries. The possibility of reverse-engineering is often brought 
up as particularly easy in the field of pharmaceutical development, which is also characterized by 
cheap production costs relative to research and development of new chemical entities. Clarisa Long, 
Our Uniform Patent System, 55 Fed. Law. 44, 45 (2008) (“Pharmaceutical research is a high-cost, 
highly uncertain process, with a final product that is cheap to reverse engineer, copy, and mass 
produce.”).  
 204. In addition to patented innovation, un-patentable basic research undertaken in high-
protection countries is also subject to free-riding. These arguably incidental advances are a net benefit 
to the worldwide scientific community, although costs are borne by companies and governments that 
fund the research and passed on to consumers as well. Long, supra note 203 at 45.  
 205. The free-rider argument appeals most strongly to those who ascribe to the idea that an 
inventor has an inherent right to her invention, so that any appropriation of that invention must 
constitute a type of stealing. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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countries with lower levels of patent protection. Failure to reap such a 
reward could be the consequence of choosing not to market a product 
there or of selling it for the lower price associated with a competitive 
market. Additionally, one might query whether consumers in countries 
with strong patent rights had the ability to pay sufficient prices to induce 
optimal levels of innovation without contribution from consumers 
elsewhere. Certainly, one concern could be that the higher prices 
companies need to charge in a non-harmonized world make innovation 
inaccessible to large numbers of consumers in high-protection countries. 
In that case, lower-income consumers in high-protection countries would 
miss out on access to innovation to the benefit of all consumers in low-
protection countries. However, there are other benefits—such as jobs 
and other capital generation—that may accrue to citizens of high-
protection countries by virtue of innovative industries. Thus, although 
the fairness argument is often used in favor of harmonization, it relies on 
other justifications for intellectual property that presume a right to 
exclude before concluding that it is unfair to deprive an inventor of that 
right. Its applicability is therefore limited. 
The fairness argument lends further support to the argument about 
the importance of certainty in the face of the unpredictable nature of 
science. If the patent right is meant to provide ex ante incentives to 
innovators, then in situations involving the greatest potential gain to 
society—those large jumps in innovation that Schumpeter described as 
the most important to stimulate206—it would be unfair to remove the 
incentive ex post based on characteristics of the field that were not 
known or understood at the time of invention. This argument is premised 
on it being a reasonable assumption that an invention will be eligible for 
patent protection. As a result, it applies to systems that offer broad 
patent protection but attempt to use flexibility to tailor those laws ex 
post. It would not apply to a system that did not offer uniform or strong 
patent protection to begin with. 
3. Economy 
The process of obtaining patents is cumbersome and expensive in 
any jurisdiction, as it consists of drafting and filing an application, 
responding to office actions (usually a type of conditional rejection) from 
the examiner by making amendments, and paying fees all along the way 
to issuance.207 If a patent application is rejected in the United States, for 
 
 206. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 84 (1950) (touting the 
importance of “competition from the . . . new technology . . . which strikes not at the margins of the 
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives”). 
 207. Following issuance, maintenance fees are also required. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
supra note 22. 
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example, the applicant may choose to challenge the decision at the PTO 
and further appeal any adverse decision to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.208 Even if a patent is issued, it 
may be challenged in post-grant review.209 In addition, the validity of 
patents is routinely challenged during post-grant infringement 
litigation.210 These costs accrue to both patent applicants and to the 
administrative and judicial systems of jurisdictions supporting patent 
systems. Even in the United States, the ability to litigate in various 
jurisdictions has come under fire for its wastefulness.211 If there are no 
meaningful differences between the laws that are applied, replicating the 
process in multiple jurisdictions—each with its own procedures—would 
certainly be wasteful.212 The “meaningful differences” caveat is no small 
condition, of course. However, where it is met, harmonization lowers 
patent costs by reducing “unnecessary redundancy [that] drives up the 
costs of obtaining and enforcing worldwide patent protection to a level 
that can only be afforded by the largest multinational corporations. . . . 
[and] also adversely impacts the governments themselves.”213 
Justifications for harmonization thus include the procedural efficiency 
gained when understanding, filing for, and managing patent portfolios in 
numerous jurisdictions. When costs are high, legal variations may be seen 
as barriers to efficient trade and investment. In addition, substantive 
harmonization or unification may be seen as necessary to allow innovators 
to fully reap the rewards of their contributions. As globalization increases, 
information is unconstrained by borders. The cost of accessing a patent 
obtained in the United States or Europe is as low as the cost of finding 
Internet access.214 Because those contemplating patent protection may also 
 
 208. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2006) (granting the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction over appeals from rejections of patent applications). 
 209. Post-grant review has been expanded with passage of the America Invents Act. 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 321–29 (2011). 
 210. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (granting the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases). 
 211. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (arguing that nothing less than the repeal of section 
337 will fix the problem of allowing multiple jurisdictions for patent litigation). 
 212. It could be argued that the cost of filing for and obtaining a patent serves a certain gate-
keeping role. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual 
Property Law, 55 Am. U. L. Rev. 845, 880–81 (2006) (suggesting that patent law deploys call options 
by noting that the “potential patentee must assess the option value or strike price of patent protection 
and compare that to the costs of exercising the option through patent prosecution” and noting that the 
potential patentee will weigh this against keeping trade secret protection or defensively publishing). 
However, it is hard to support a costly process simply for its sorting value, particularly where the same 
result could be obtained by charging higher fees for a streamlined, multi-jurisdictional process. 
 213. Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Ku, World Patent System Circa 20XX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 
530 (1998). 
 214. Both the PTO and the European Patent Office maintain free, user-friendly, online search 
engines. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Dep’t of Commerce, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/ 
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opt to keep their innovations as trade secrets, the universal availability of 
information contained in patents could, when combined with low levels of 
protection in other countries, weigh in favor of non-disclosure. In the 
aggregate, such decisions have the ability to retard future innovation. 
One other argument for harmonization is that it may be a means to 
target types of innovation that have small or underfunded markets in 
individual countries. Collaborations facilitated by WIPO, for example, 
create initiatives to address malaria prevention through concerted efforts 
among innovators and establishment of intellectual property hubs.215 These 
coordinated efforts are easier to implement with harmonized intellectual 
property laws. The counterargument is that a patent system is not the 
only, or necessarily the most efficient, way of producing innovation.216 
Other methods of encouraging innovation have been proposed and 
analyzed. Some of these have been implemented. The most discussed 
alternative consists of offering prizes for finding the solutions to difficult 
problems.217 And there are industries that have never traditionally been 
eligible for patents that have thrived and produced innovation.218 
Nevertheless, the efficiency of harmonizing aspects of the patent system 
is clear given that many countries have patent systems, companies have 
relied on them to fund their innovation, and trade barriers have been 
lowered and trade increased by leaps and bounds in the past few 
decades. Of course, efficiency alone may not be enough to counterbalance 
arguments in favor of flexibility. Thus, efficiency weighs heavier in 
arguments about harmonizing procedural aspects of patent law than 
substantive aspects. 
 
process/search (last visited Oct. 31, 2013); European Patent Office, http://www.epo.org/ 
searching.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). Google also has a patent search tool that creates a search 
bar specifically for patents. Google, http://www.google.com/?tbm=pts (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 215. Matt Rainey, Director: Innovation Division, World Intellectual Prop. Org., Address at the 
World Intellectual Property Organization’s 6th Advanced Research Forum on Intellectual Property 
Rights: Networked Innovation: Solutions for Local and Regional Needs (July 12, 2012) (describing 
how the creation of research and development networks and intellectual property hubs in Colombia, 
various Western African countries, and the middle east can focus on problems like neglected diseases 
or development of an innovation industry—goals that would be near impossible for any one of the 
governments to accomplish on their own). Non-governmental organizations, such as the Pan-
American Health Organization, also create some of these pharmaceutical collaborations. See Pan Am. 
Health Org., http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?lang=en (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (search for 
“Pharmaceutical Collaborations”). 
 216. Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 158–66. 
 217. See generally Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 115 (2003) 
(discussing prizes as incentives); James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D 
for New Medicines, 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1519 (2007). 
 218. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy: How Imitation Sparks 
Innovation (2012) (examining innovative industries that thrive without formal intellectual property 
protection). 
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One might expect that the gains to patent applicants from 
harmonization could be counterbalanced by access-enhancing measures, 
but that has not been the case. For example, if a patent applicant can 
access more markets because of the ready availability of patent 
protection in multiple jurisdictions, perhaps a shorter patent term would 
suffice to recompense her the cost of research and development. But by 
and large, no one has suggested that harmonization should be 
accompanied by concessions from patent holders. Thus, negotiations that 
move toward harmonization are favorable to patent applicants and 
holders by reducing the cost of securing patent protection in multiple 
jurisdictions. They are favorable to patent offices, which may be able to 
rely in part on work from other patent offices in making their 
determinations. The benefits in terms of access, however, are indirect, 
and rely on a mercantilist assumption that consumers in countries 
without patent protection will not have access to new technologies 
because no one in those countries will manufacture there. If instead 
countries without patent protection would have cheaper access to the 
technology (from manufacturers who need not go to the expense of 
negotiating licenses), then these consumers do not benefit from 
harmonization in any direct sense. 
4. Capture and the Public Choice Argument 
There is another reason that uniform rules for all technologies might 
be preferable to a balkanized patent regime. Diverse stakeholders make 
their voices heard in the legislative and administrative processes that 
govern patent law; however, applying technology-specific rules may 
make it easier for associated industries to capture the process by dividing 
groups that are likely to oppose them. Once a different set of rules is 
held to apply to one area, those with vested interests in that area can 
focus their lobbying efforts on it, while natural opponents will only 
sometimes be as focused in their resistance.219 
In the international setting, this same argument applies a fortiorari. 
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement’s entry into force, many countries 
granted lower levels of patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions. 
Notably, this was true in Brazil and India, both of which have robust 
 
 219. The Patent Crisis, supra note 3, at 99–100 (2009) (explaining that industry-specific legislation 
is more vulnerable than general legislation to lobbying); see Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 45, 50–56 (2000) 
(discussing how rent-seeking, backward-looking behavior can undermine the forward-looking 
purposes of the patent system). 
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domestic industries in generic drug production.220 Of course, TRIPS now 
requires that there be no discrimination in patent laws as to fields of 
technology.221 Before the TRIPS requirements went into force, 
stakeholders in the pharmaceutical industry in these countries had 
interests that aligned with the public health and access industries of the 
populations. Manufacturers in these countries made generic versions of 
drugs that were patented in other countries, and thus had no incentive to 
seek patent protection for pharmaceutical products. In terms of public 
health, there was no incentive to increase patent protection because it 
would lead to higher prices and less availability of medicines. None of the 
stakeholders in the legislative process would be likely to voice the benefits 
of having a patent system that covered pharmaceutical products. If there 
were no requirement of patent availability without discrimination as to 
field of technology, the dominant industry in each country would be able 
to capture the legislature and press for laws that were only beneficial to 
that industry. If those laws were objectively good, then they might be 
beneficial in other industries as well. If instead those laws struck a poor 
balance between innovation and access, the opposition would more likely 
be fragmented as laws would only apply to one technology area. 
This Part has explained the justifications for harmonization among 
countries and uniformity within them. These arguments sound in certainty, 
fairness, economy, and public choice. Compelling though they may be, 
there are sound arguments that favor tailoring measures. These include the 
efficiencies associated with tailoring, the ability to respond to diverse local 
needs—including specific needs like access to medicine—and the benefits 
of experimentation and improvement in the law. These arguments all 
underlie the instances of tailoring discussed in this Article. 
B. The Other Side: The Value of Flexibility 
1. Tailored Efficiency 
Many scholars have explained how the uniform duration of patent 
rights will lead to overcompensation in some situations and under 
compensation in others.222 Some patent holders will receive protection for 
 
 220. Jeffery Atik & Hans Henrik Lidgard, Embracing Price Discrimination: TRIPS and the 
Suppression of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1043, 1047 (2006) 
(describing India and Brazil as having “vibrant generic drugs sectors”). 
 221. TRIPS, supra note 54, art. 27.1 (“[P]atents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable 
without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
imported or locally produced.”). 
 222. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, 
and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 132 (2008); see also Frank Emmert, Trade and Intellectual 
Property, in International Trade Law 4 (Henry Wang ed., 2012); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study 
of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming 
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much longer than would have been necessary to induce them to innovate. 
In other situations, the patent term will not be sufficient for an inventor 
to recoup costs and be rewarded for her contribution to “science and the 
useful arts.” This too-short term will either result in under compensation 
or, more troubling from a utilitarian, innovation-optimizing viewpoint, 
lower levels of innovation based on ex ante predictions of potential 
future profitability. In a series of articles, Michael Carroll addressed the 
inefficiencies that arise from having uniform intellectual property laws 
and proposed a framework for tailoring rights to avoid such costs.223 
Assuming that the current patent regime encourages the optimal level of 
innovation at least sometimes, the dual risks of under-stimulation of 
innovation and over-protection of intellectual property will manifest in 
inventions that differ in technology areas or business structures. Thus, 
the optimization of patent protection will depend on the varied attributes 
of different technology areas, including the research and development 
life cycle, the ease of reverse engineering a product (a process of 
recreating the innovation from the end product), and the complexity and 
number of parts included in the final product. These concerns are 
manifest in attempts to curb the patenting of software and to increase 
patent protection for pharmaceutical products. Software has a shorter 
research and development life cycle than pharmaceuticals, which have the 
additional hurdle of regulatory approval. In addition to being difficult to 
develop, pharmaceutical products are easy to reverse engineer, making 
patent rights necessary to market control. Calls for reform in these areas 
have focused on these attributes while arguing for the importance—or 
irrelevance—of patent protection to support innovation. 
In addition, although the uncertain nature of technological progress 
may weigh in favor of certainty in the law,224 it can also justify flexibility. 
In particular, because science and technology are always advancing in 
ways that are impossible to predict, a flexible regime allows policy 
makers to “modify their intellectual property rules to readjust the 
 
Innovators?, 161 U. Penn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (finding that the length of the patent term is 
exploited by non-practicing entities who primarily sue for infringement during the last years of the 
patent term, primarily in high tech industries). 
 223. Carroll, supra note 212 (identifying and exploring the nature of uniformity costs associated 
with different types of intellectual property and suggesting solutions, such as expanding the use of 
patent renewal fees, to tailor the duration of rights); Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the 
Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 421, 429 (2007) (applying a uniformity 
cost analysis to the grant of permanent injunctions and suggesting that application of the equitable 
four factor test will result in industry-specific rules that alleviate some of that cost); Carroll, supra note 
3 (providing a framework for determining when proposed tailoring is desirable based on the 
innovation-producing goals of intellectual property and the political economy justifications for 
otherwise issuing one-size-fits-all rights). 
 224. See supra Part IV.A. 
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balance between public and private rights.”225 This also applies to 
changes in the structure of funding innovation. Markets for patents and 
the emergence of non-practicing entities is the most recent example of 
the emergence of a business structure that may upset the innovation-
access balance.226 Thus, in contrast to the certainty and fairness 
justifications for uniform application of the law discussed in this Article, 
flexibility can be defended in technology areas that already exist, where 
rights-holders may be able to negotiate with each other, deriving a more 
efficient system based on the specific attributes of a particular 
technology. 
2. Diverse Local Interests 
Patent systems do not exist in a vacuum, and their benefits are 
measured according to the values and needs of the populations in which 
they are implemented. It should be no surprise, then, that countries with 
vastly different industrial strengths and public needs would strive to 
implement systems that best suit those values and needs. Thus, in 
contrast to situations in which tailoring patent laws remedies some 
objective inefficiency in the incentive-access balance, countries may 
pursue tailoring measures that reflect their varied assessments of the 
relative benefits of innovation and the costs of reduced access. 
One widely used example is the unique treatment countries give to 
patents on inventions related to healthcare. Tailoring measures in this 
area include those discussed in Part III, such as the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
India’s decision to implement legislation excluding from patent eligibility 
new chemical forms of known substances, and others, like the European 
exclusion of surgical, diagnostic, and therapeutic methods from patent 
eligibility.227 In the Indian and European examples, the cost of granting 
exclusive rights has been determined as too high, regardless of the 
benefits. There is an overwhelming interest in access in these situations; 
in particular, it has been the main concern for developing countries in the 
years surrounding the TRIPS Agreement’s negotiation and entry into 
force. In developing countries, the public may not be able to afford to 
pay the premium associated with a patent monopoly. If, instead of seeing 
innovation as holding importance on its own, one sees it as a means to 
other social goods,228 then developing countries rightly privilege those 
 
 225. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 95. 
 226. See supra Part III (discussing the permanent injunctions following eBay v. MercExchange). 
 227. Article 53 of the European Patent Convention excludes surgical, therapeutic, and diagnostic 
methods for humans or animals from patent eligibility. European Patent Convention art. 53, Oct. 5, 
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (revised version entered into force Dec. 13, 2007). 
 228. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural 
Perspective, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2008) (suggesting that technological innovation can suit the 
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social goods over a system that will act as a barrier to their realization. A 
strong patent regime is associated with a lack of access to new 
technologies for the public—an effect that is particularly troubling when 
applied to global health.229 Thus, many of the disagreements surrounding 
harmonization have focused on the availability and strength of patents 
for pharmaceutical products or processes. 
Also of particular concern to developing countries is the 
relationship between patents and industrial development. While strong 
patent systems are associated with countries that are considered 
innovative, the characteristics have tended to evolve together. The 
industrial interests of a country are likely to be dynamic, a characteristic 
acknowledged by WTO member countries in their definition of a large 
swath of countries as “developing,” a term that denotes growth and 
movement from one type of economy to another.230 In evaluating 
potential flexibilities in their patent laws, countries will likely evaluate 
their industrial needs, and they will likely differ from those of other 
countries depending on the level of development and the relative 
strength of different sectors of industry. This is apparent from 
observations of the effects of strong intellectual property law on 
economies with different levels of development. 
It is not a given that high levels of intellectual property will spur 
innovation in a country that does not already have an infrastructure to 
support it. The argument in favor of harmonization is that higher levels 
of protection will strengthen developing countries economically, if not 
through directly spurring innovation, then by encouraging foreign 
investment. Without endorsing the argument, Frederick Abbott 
explained that new intellectual property rights infrastructures “would 
encourage local innovation as developing country inventors were 
enabled to exploit the fruits of their own labor. Foreign enterprises 
would be more willing to transfer technology as it became protected 
under local law. Foreign direct investment would increase as local 
conditions became more technology protection-friendly.”231 Many 
developed countries used this argument during TRIPS negotiations: that 
local investors would profit and access would be increased as foreign 
companies felt encouraged to invest in regimes with hitherto weak patent 
 
goal of increasing welfare “[b]y mitigating disease and hunger [and] . . . . foster[ing] educational, 
political, and social development”). 
 229. See generally Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra note 17. 
 230. Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, WTO, www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/tif_e/ 
dev1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2013) (listing various provisions of special treatment for developing 
countries). 
 231. See Abbott, supra note 195, at 499 (“[T]he achievement of certain social, political and legal 
preconditions may be needed before markets can be left to take care of themselves.”). 
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protection. However, many argue that the gains of TRIPS accrue to 
wealthy countries—where the majority of innovative activity is 
centered—while the costs accrue to poor countries.232 This view is 
supported by the concessions granted to developing countries during the 
negotiation of TRIPS that did not relate to intellectual property, but 
instead centered on the opening of new markets to textiles and other 
goods.233 
For the least developed countries, there is little evidence to support 
a claim that the sudden imposition of strong intellectual property laws 
will encourage development. Patent systems are attractive to countries 
with innovative industries, as shown by the historical development of 
patent law in modern industrialized nations. The establishment of the 
publishing industry in the United States through rampant copying of 
foreign works is one example of industrial development fostered by 
initially low levels of intellectual property rights.234 Subsequently, of 
course, the industry became stronger and therefore motivated to push for 
stronger protection.235 Anupam Chander looks at much more recent 
history and suggests that comparative flexibility in intellectual property-
related laws is in part responsible for Silicon Valley’s location in the 
United States.236 Some developing countries have strong domestic 
industries that are imitative rather than innovative, and for whom patent 
laws would be destructive.237 The generic drug industry in India is one 
example.238 As a result, the access concerns of the public and of public 
 
 232. See, e.g., T.N. Srinivasen, The TRIPS Agreement: A Comment Inspired by Frederick 
Abbott’s Presentation 3 (Nov. 29, 2000) (unpublished comment), available at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~srinivas/TRIPS.pdf. 
 233. Neofederalist Vision, supra note 68, at 32. 
 234. B. Zorina Khan, Does Copyright Piracy Pay? The Effects of U.S. International Copyright 
Laws on the Market for Books, 1790–1920 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 10271, 2004). This relationship between industrial development and lax legal protections was also 
famously made in the context of tort law. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American 
Law 1780–1860 (1977). But see Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century 
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 Yale L.J. 1717, 1735 (1981) (challenging Horwitz’s interpretation of 
early American tort law). 
 235. The United States has very strong copyright protection, made stronger through industry 
lobbying for longer copyright terms. What used to be a comparable term of rights to patent rights, 
copyright terms now extend for seventy years after the death of the author of a work. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 302(a) (2012). 
 236. Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2340197 (arguing that comparatively less rigid 
privacy laws and a robust right to free speech in the United States made it far more attractive to 
Internet-related innovation than other countries). 
 237. See Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing 
Countries 12 (2001) (noting that in India, there is a strong industry that produces “credible 
equivalents of products protected by IP elsewhere”). 
 238. Id. 
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health advocates in such countries is bolstered by the interests of local 
industry and those it supports.239 
Other country-specific factors may influence the desire to deviate 
from the new intellectual property norms.240 Furthermore, efficiency 
concerns, differing public interests,241 and diverse industrial policies and 
preferences will align in some cases and be at odds in others. All are 
likely to inform an analysis of a given measure. In addition to these, 
however, there is an argument for flexibility for its own sake, which this 
Article will now address. 
3. Federalist Arguments for Flexibility 
Flexibility among patent law regimes may also be desirable precisely 
because it results in a diversity of laws. John Duffy has suggested that 
diversity among patent laws allows for legal experimentation, innovation, 
and ultimately improvement.242 While recognizing that some level of 
harmonization may be desirable, Duffy suggests that in addition to 
allowing countries to be responsive to local needs and preferences, 
diversity allows for precisely the type of innovation in patent law that 
patent law is meant to spur in the sciences.243 This argument, 
championing flexibility qua flexibility, imagines a dynamic global patent 
regime under constant improvement. It also underscores the dynamic 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. A separate line of argument relating to both the level of industrial development in developing 
countries and the access concerns of the public suggests that the traditional patent regime, rewarding 
an individual inventor with rights impinging on public access, does not fit with the model of discovery 
and innovation in certain developing countries. Thus, for countries rich in “traditional knowledge,” 
valuable subject matter and knowledge is possessed collectively and benefited from by all. At the same 
time, for various reasons, such knowledge would not be patentable. These reasons include that the 
subject matter may be considered unpatentable laws of nature or that the knowledge is old enough not 
to be considered novel. Nonetheless, companies from developed countries may exploit the knowledge 
for free while protecting the results with patents. Imagine, for example, a plant that is known by 
indigenous peoples to have curative powers. While the plant and its use in medicinal applications is 
likely unpatentable, an isolated chemical derived from the plant might result in high profits to the 
company that learns of its use and appropriates that knowledge without paying a premium. This 
possibility has led to calls for protection of indigenous rights in traditional knowledge. For example, 
WIPO established the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore in September 2000, and in 2009 tasked it with drafting a 
recommendation or treaty on this topic. For an overview of their progress, see Intergovernmental 
Committee, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/index.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
 241. Maskus, supra note 12 (“There is no clear answer to whether an IPRs system should favor 
invention (exclusion) or diffusion (access) without knowing a broad range of related national (or 
regional) characteristics, including society’s objective function. Such answers would vary between 
closed and open economies and between developed and developing economies, with rapidly 
industrializing economies somewhere between.”) 
 242. See Duffy, supra note 202, at 707–09; see also Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 5. 
 243. See Duffy, supra note 202, at 692. 
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nature of both industrial development and legal protection that has 
characterized development around the world. 
The Federalist conception of global patent law can accommodate 
the substantive justifications for flexibility discussed in the previous 
Subparts. Developing countries have less-developed industry in addition 
to less wealthy populaces. Both of these conditions have led to a general 
consensus that for developing countries, strong levels of intellectual 
property rights are also less desirable.244 Critics of harmonization dismiss 
the idea that strong intellectual property rights will necessarily lead to 
higher levels of development.245 Others take a social justice viewpoint, 
focusing on the impact prices that include a patent premium can have on 
health in poor societies.246 Both the development concerns for developing 
countries and the access concerns for their populations inform arguments 
suggesting that local preferences may dictate variations from a unified 
patent law under a federalist view of global law. Moreover, this argument 
provides a response to the efficiency argument supporting 
harmonization, suggesting instead that a varied global system will 
ultimately support adoption of more efficient law. Any current costs 
borne from the inefficiency of maintaining multiple systems may be 
counteracted by future gains accrued as a result of as-yet unforeseen 
improvements. Ultimately, the Federalist argument may be a way to 
make peace with flexibility that is inherent in the system, either because 
it is impossible to reach agreement or because legal rules develop to 
incorporate considerations of beneficial tailoring in a fact (and therefore 
industry) specific way. Regardless of the reason, much flexibility remains. 
These arguments in favor of and against harmonization provide the 
means for assessing these deliberate and inherent flexibilities. 
C. Institutions and Interests 
An assessment of the flexibilities implemented by a country that is 
separate from the legal question of TRIPS-compliance and also 
recognizes and honors the different ways that countries weigh the costs 
 
 244. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without 
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 Duke L.J. 85, 94–99, 
103–08 (2007). 
 245. Srinivasen, supra note 232 (suggesting that the “theoretical justification for, and even more 
importantly, the empirical evidence” in support of arguments that TRIPS-level protection is necessary 
to encourage innovation and that foreign enterprises strongly weigh the strength of IPR before 
investing “is not at all strong”); see Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, 
and Overprotective, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 613, 614 (1996) (stating that the successful 
implementation of TRIPS will be “one of the most successful vehicles of Western imperialism in this 
story”). 
 246.  Hestermeyer, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 207 (examining whether access to medicine 
is a human right under the WTO). 
Rajec_19 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:19 PM 
December 2013]      EVALUATING FLEXIBILITY 205 
 
and benefits of innovation and access must draw from the arguments for 
and against harmonization. These arguments—for certainty, fairness, 
economy, and public choice on the harmonization side, for tailored 
efficiency, diverse local interests, and legal innovation on the other—lead 
to insights about the desirability of a flexibility based on the 
implementing institution and the interests and stakeholders represented. 
Looking to the process by which a given flexibility is introduced and 
applied gives insight into how well it meets the justifications for 
departure from uniformity. Although each measure requires individual 
evaluation, some generalizations can be drawn from analysis of the 
institution that implements the measure and how broadly the various 
patent law stakeholders are represented. 
Legislative tailoring measures can satisfy many of the values that 
proponents of flexibility champion. Given that lawmakers are 
accountable to the public through elections and therefore may be best 
positioned to realize the particular interests in their jurisdiction, they can 
react to inefficiencies in specific industries and adjust the grant and scope 
of patents accordingly. In addition, legislative procedures generally allow 
for input from affected industries and other stakeholders, including 
foreign stakeholders. One might challenge the ability to weigh the 
interests of stakeholders who are not constituents, but outside 
stakeholders are not without their means of influence, and it is typically 
greater at a national, policymaking level than with administrative bodies 
or the judiciary. Legislative measures also satisfy federalist arguments for 
diversity of laws by making explicit the conditions under which the 
“experiment” of a tailored measure will operate, potentially allowing for 
a more thoughtful evolution of patent law. 
Legislative tailoring is not without its drawbacks, however, 
particularly in terms of accounting for the arguments in favor of 
harmonized patent law. The certainty justification cuts both ways. On the 
one hand, a legislative tailoring measure can have carefully drawn 
contours so that patent holders and the public are on notice as to the 
target and scope of the measure. However, this requires line-drawing 
between industries, which can be difficult for existing technologies, never 
mind the development and synthesis of new fields of study.247 Uncertainty 
in developing fields is thus a likelihood with legislative measures, 
particularly given the generally slow pace of legislative reaction. In 
addition, the attempt to provide certainty can lead to complex laws that 
 
 247. The Patent Crisis, supra note 3, at 97–98. Burk and Lemley also point to the difficulty of 
crafting laws that will remain relevant as technology advances. Id. at 98–99 (suggesting that the 
obsolescence of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act is likely “nature of the semiconductor 
business changed to make the manufacturing process much more difficult and hence harder to imitate 
at low cost”). 
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attempt to address many possible scenarios. This is costly given that 
certainty is impossible to achieve and it frustrates the economy concerns 
behind harmonization by creating complex legal carve-outs. Most 
importantly, legislative tailoring, when ambitious enough, may result in 
public choice problems, particularly in later rounds of lawmaking. When 
a particular field of technology is separated from others, subsequent 
lobbying efforts for reform raise stronger concerns about public choice. 
Some of the problems associated with legislative tailoring measures 
can be alleviated through broadly worded laws that delegate 
interpretation to administrative agencies. Agencies are able to adapt to 
changes in industry more quickly than legislatures due to their focus on 
particular subject matters and their non-democratic structures. 
Furthermore, peopled with experts, they may get it right more often. 
Agency implementation satisfies many of the same flexibility goals as 
legislative tailoring measures while maintaining the transparency and 
detailed rules that allow for greater certainty. For example, a patent 
office with the authority can issue rules governing its patent eligibility 
criteria for relatively newly-developed industries far more quickly than a 
legislature, providing some level of ex ante certainty for nascent 
industries. Nonetheless, such a scheme suffers from the same problems in 
hindering global efficiency and in public choice. From a global viewpoint, 
administrative implementation of flexibilities raise concerns because 
however broadly an agency sees its constituency, foreign stakeholder 
interests are likely to come in a far third to the interests of the domestic 
public and domestic industry. Industry capture (at the expense of the 
public interest) is also a concern in administrative setting.248 
Judicial tailoring can also satisfy the purposes of flexibility. Burk 
and Lemley suggest that judicial tailoring is more desirable than 
legislative tailoring for reasons that sound in efficiency justifications.249 
According to their account, the fact-specific way that economic theory 
applies to patents makes it particularly difficult and costly to detail in 
laws.250 If courts were willing to make industry-specific rulings with policy 
in mind, then they would better satisfy the efficiency purposes of 
flexibility. In addition, courts are likely less vulnerable to capture, but 
this does not always mean that all stakeholder interests are represented 
 
 248. In particular, agency personnel are often not politically accountable to the extent that elected 
officials are. At the same time, they are more likely to have ties to the industry that they regulate and 
may see that industry as their funding source, either for the institution or for future employment. See, 
e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 1–37 
(1991); Merges & Reynolds, supra note 219. 
 249. The Patent Crisis, supra note 3, at 97–99. 
 250. Id. 
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in that forum, either.251 While judicial hearings involve parties on two 
sides of an issue, patent law does not only have two sides.252 And while 
appellate courts often invite and accept amicus briefs from non-parties 
expressing interests not otherwise represented in the litigation, such 
representation is less likely in subsequent district court cases that adapt 
and apply the law to new situations. Possibly most important in the 
context of international assessment of flexibility is the comparative 
advantage that courts have in their “institutional competence and 
doctrinal flexibility to adapt to” assessments of ever-changing industries 
that are necessarily “preliminary and subject to revision.”253 Nevertheless, 
this very same “doctrinal flexibility” has a considerable influence on 
certainty. In addition, because court decisions are backwards-looking, 
certainty concerns are amplified by having courts make policy decisions. 
And if domestic scholars cannot agree—or speculate as to—the intended 
meaning and scope of a Supreme Court opinion, surely this tailoring 
method will not inspire certainty abroad, nor is it likely to lead to similar 
rules in other jurisdictions. As is evident, all of these institutions have 
benefits and drawbacks as implementers of patent tailoring regimes. 
However, this Article proposes a framework for viewing specific tailoring 
measures from a “country-neutral” perspective. 
V.  Implications 
That the framework discussed in the previous Parts gives no black 
and white answers should be no surprise to scholars of international law 
or intellectual property law. Nonetheless, the framework provides a 
productive means of evaluation of past tailoring measures as well as 
future contemplated measures, by focusing evaluation of tailoring 
measures on their means of implementation and the extent to which they 
accommodate harmonization values. Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act can 
be categorized as a complex legislative scheme, negotiated with all the 
relevant stakeholders, and administered by the Food and Drug 
Administration. The complexity allows for careful tailoring but, as one 
might expect, problems emerge alongside new technologies that might 
benefit from similar treatment, but that do not fall under the scope of the 
 
 251. Id. at 104–05. 
 252. For example, while one might expect biotechnology companies to bring claims of patent 
infringement and invalidity against each other, they are highly unlikely to argue that biotech should 
not be patent eligible subject matter. This can lead to situations where companies in an industry have 
no incentive to challenge the patent eligibility of that technology while the public has no standing to 
do so. Thus in Myriad, for example, the ACLU’s standing to challenge so-called “gene patents” is 
hotly contested. 
 253. The Patent Crisis, supra note 3, at 165. 
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law.254 In addition, while the Act balanced innovation incentives, access 
interests, and the interests of both the generic and pioneer drug 
industries, the capture concerns outlined above appear to have 
manifested in some of the strategic behavior exhibited by pioneer and 
generic drug companies.255 These criticisms do not mean that the Hatch-
Waxman Act should not have been passed, but rather focus critical 
evaluation of the measure and can help to inform future reforms. 
The Indian tailoring measures discussed above were enacted 
through less complex legislation with more discretion left to the Indian 
Patent Office and courts. The law barring new forms and uses of known 
chemicals was meant to counteract criticism that pharmaceutical 
companies elsewhere have been able to gain protection for longer than 
their initial discoveries warrant through creative claiming of new forms 
and uses of chemicals. Thus, it can be seen as an efficiency-enhancing 
law, solving a discrete problem in line with the purposes of flexibility. It 
also meets the local needs, which, in the case of India, include both a 
large patient need for lower-cost medicines and the needs of the local 
generic drug industry.  
However, there may yet be cause for concern. Because the involved 
stakeholders’ interests align and are implemented through an institution 
that is less sensitive to foreign concerns, the measures raise fairness 
concerns. Certainty is also a concern, as the standards for determining an 
“efficacious” new use or form of a substance are unclear. Indeed, the 
Court failed to shine any light on the matter, issuing a results-oriented 
opinion that raised and failed to distinguish between numerous 
interpretations. In the end, it may be that no follow-on pharmaceutical 
patent will be found valid—a result the Court insists is not its aim, but 
seems likely given its detour into discussions of patient need and 
suggested statutory interpretations.256 In addition, the measures are 
technology specific, again raising public choice concerns. The compulsory 
licensing provision similarly satisfies the justifications for flexibility while 
 
 254. The treatment of FDA approval for generic forms of biologics provides one example. Biologic 
treatments are derived from living materials. Although these treatments are similar in innovative 
process and market role to drug development, they were not covered by the provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act. Legislative action was necessary to include biologics in that framework. Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. VII.A, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010). 
While the Hatch-Waxman Act may have balanced the needs of multiple stakeholders, that does not 
mean that those actors will unquestioningly accept the same scheme for biologic treatments. Thus, 
Abbott Laboratories filed a petition with the FDA requesting that applications submitted before 
enactment of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 be exempt, suggesting that 
allowing generic firms to rely on data it had submitted would constitute a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. Citizen Petition from Abbott Laboratories to the FDA, No. FDA-2012-P-0317-0001/CP 
(Apr. 2, 2012). 
 255. See, e.g., Derzko, supra note 112. 
 256. See supra Part III.A. 
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raising fairness, capture, and certainty concerns. Stakeholders who might 
oppose the measure do not know the frequency with which such 
measures will be implemented or the circumstances. 
The judicial tailoring measures discussed above can also be evaluated 
according to this framework. In all the cases, relevant stakeholders were 
represented through the submission of amicus briefs, reducing public 
choice concerns.257 However, faced only with the facts of the cases before 
it, the Court does not have the same leeway to tailor measures as does 
the legislature and thus we might be concerned about the quality of any 
resulting rule. In terms of certainty, the trends and rules adopted by the 
district courts following eBay became predictable relatively quickly, even 
if their methodology is subject to criticism.258 Thus, although there may 
have been some initial certainty concerns, sophisticated non-practicing 
entities will likely factor in the likelihood of obtaining an injunction to 
valuations of patent portfolios. It remains to be seen whether these 
tailoring measures result in greater access for consumers while maintaining 
sufficient incentives to innovate, but on balance, it appears to be a tailoring 
mechanism that meets the purposes of allowing flexibility while 
minimizing the concerns underlying our generally uniform system. It is 
possible that certainty will emerge for patent eligibility over the years 
following Mayo and Myriad. However, the Court’s reluctance to draw 
easily-administered—or easily extrapolated—lines between patent-
eligible subject matter and ineligible subject matter has necessarily 
resulted in reduced certainty for domestic and foreign industry and fails 
to provide coherent rules that could provide a model for other 
jurisdictions if it is in fact successful. 
Conclusion 
All jurisdictions engage in some measure of tailoring, whether in the 
design or the application of their laws. These can be evaluated in 
different ways. One measure of possible analysis is whether a measure is 
legal under the international agreements governing patent law that strive 
for uniformity. The doctrinal evaluation is an important endeavor, but 
one that accepts the negotiated agreements as fully accounting for all 
needed flexibility. This perspective will always give credence to national 
 
 257. See, e.g., Brief for the Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150); Brief for the AARP & Pub. Patent 
Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) 
(No. 10-1150). 
 258. See Rajec, supra note 3 (suggesting that courts are denying injunctions to non-practicing 
entities, but that their methodology for doing so based on market share is both under and over 
inclusive, properly applied, and arguing for such determinations to be made under the public interest 
prong of the eBay test, allowing for an explicit accounting of the public interest in access). 
Rajec_19 (M. Stevens) (Do Not Delete) 12/2/2013 1:19 PM 
210 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:153 
 
attempts at tailoring, but cannot be extended to draw normative 
conclusions about those measures. Another approach is for flexibilities to 
be analyzed by how well they match the local values vis à vis innovation, 
recognizing that patents are a balance between incentives to innovate 
and access. Such an analysis looks at how well a measure solves a 
particular inefficiency or meets the specific and varied needs of diverse 
jurisdictions. The prescriptive analysis has its purposes, too, of aiding 
those who wish to endorse, criticize, or amend specific tailoring measures 
within a jurisdiction. Such an analysis must assign weight to the values 
underlying a patent system, necessarily privileging efficiency, access, 
innovation incentives, and short- and long-term industrial goals relative 
to each other. As such, and similar to the doctrinal approach, the 
consequentialist approach is an analytical method useful within a given 
jurisdiction and the parameters of its values, but it can be done absent 
any consideration of the content of international agreements. Thus, one 
approach fails to question the international framework while the other 
fails to account for it. Neither wrestles with the harmonization 
justifications in global patent law, because each is undertaken from a 
domestic perspective. The framework set forth here acknowledges and 
honors the development of an increasingly harmonized, global patent law 
while recognizing the value of maintaining flexibility. This recognition 
encompasses both the realization that flexibility is inevitable and that, 
from an international perspective, our inquiry should not be whether 
they allowed to do that or if that is what is best for them. Instead, this 
Article suggests we ask whether the tailoring mechanism was undertaken 
in a way that minimizes harm to concerns of certainty, fairness, economy, 
and public choice, while pursuing efficiency and the legitimate needs of 
the local population, thereby also allowing for necessary room for 
improvement in the law. 
This framework allows for a normative analysis of an ever-changing 
legal landscape, consisting of a broad range of tailoring measures that are 
implemented in countries of varying levels of development and with 
varied local interests. It respects the global movement toward patent law 
harmonization by valuing the participation of multiple stakeholders in 
addition to transparency and the certainty it affords. At the same time, 
by focusing on the institutions and processes through which tailoring 
measures are implemented, the suggested framework accepts that even a 
utilitarian justification for intellectual property may incorporate different 
and evolving conceptions of an efficient patent system. 
